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NOTES
An Evaluation of Municipal Income Taxation
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years a series of tumultuous events have confronted local
governments across the nation. Our cities have been racked with civil
disorders and face seemingly insurmountable fiscal problems.
Furthermore, traditional sources of revenue have proven insufficient to
meet the economic needs of local governments whose annual
expenditures have grown from an estimated nine billion dollars in 1946
to more than 50 billion in 1965, and currently approach 100 billion
dollars.' In an effort to solve the problem of burgeoning expenses,
several central cities have turned to the municipal income tax, which
broadens the tax base to include "daylight residents" who benefit from
central-city services during the day but return, tax-free, to their
suburban communities in the evening.
A growing number of cities, beginning with Philadelphia in 1938,2
have imposed personal and corporate income taxes. The list of major
cities presently imposing the tax includes New York, Pittsburgh,
Baltimore, Cleveland, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Kansas City, Louisville,Detroit, and Grand Rapids. One characteristic common to all cities
which have enacted the tax is an urgent need for new sources of
revenue. Philadelphia, for example, was faced with bankruptcy; Detroit
and Cincinnati were plagued by huge budget deficits. A recent survey
indicated that approximately 1,750 taxing jurisdictions, ranging from
large cities to small townships, imposed some form of income tax In
the past two years, the number of persons paying city income taxes has
I. FORTUNE, March 1965, at 106-07. In New York City, expenses have doubled since the
mid-fifties, while available revenue has increased by less than 75'. U.S. Ni-ws & WORLD RIiORT.
March 21, 1966. at 82.
2. Charleston, South Carolina, adopted the first municipal income tax in the early 1800's;
however, it was abandoned due to administrative difficulties.
3. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1965, § 4 (Editorial), at 4, col. I (late city ed.). Eighty-live percent
of all cities currently imposing income taxes are located in Ohio and Pennsylvania, which do not
have statewide income taxes.
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doubled to more than eighteen million. The prospects are great that this
trend will continue.4
In order to delineate the perspective of this Note, two observations
must be made. First, the term "municipal income tax" encompasses
many variations from city to city in the legal nomenclature used to
identify the tax. For example, "wage taxes," "payroll taxes,"
"earnings taxes," and "occupational license taxes" are widely used
terms which simply disguise the presence of a municipal income tax.
Secondly, in relation to the traditional municipal property and sales
taxes, the municipal income tax is normally supplemental rather than
substitutional. An increased utilization of the municipal income tax,
however, should partially relieve the burden now imposed on these
traditional revenue sources.' Although the proportion of municipal
revenue raised by the municipal income tax remains relatively low,7 the
Philadelphia experience has demonstrated that the difference between
the revenues received from the property and income taxes narrows
considerably after the income tax has been in effect for a short time.

II.

THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX STRUCTURE

A.

HistoricalBackground

Philadelphia, in 1938, became the first city to adopt the municipal
income tax. This ordinance was passed under the authority of the
Sterling Act,9 which was adopted by the Pennsylvania Legislature in
4. See H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 477 (1964).
5. R. SIGAFOOS. THE MUNICIPAL INCO.NiE TAX: ITS HISTORY AND PROBLE\|S 12 (1955).
6. In 1966, out of a total local revenue yield of approximately 27 billion dollars, only 472
million came from income taxation, while over 2 billion resulted from sales taxes and 23 billion
from property taxes. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES, no. 581, at 408 (89th ed. 1968).
7. In 1966 municipal income taxation accounted for 5.6% of all taxes collected by major
cities. Christian Science Monitor, April 13, 1968, at I, col. 4 (midwest ed.). The New York City
personal income tax in the 1966-67 fiscal year yielded 122.1 million dollars from residents and
14 million dollars from commuters. In 1967-68 it was expected to yield 141.5 million dollars from
residents and 15.5 million from commuters. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1968, at 42, col. I (late city
ed.).
8. The Philadelphia income tax, which has increased from 16 million dollars in 1940 to 91
million dollars in 1966, yielded 42% of the total local tax revenues in 1966 as compared with 4611
for property taxes. See Christian Science Monitor, supra note 7, at 3, col. 3.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15971 (Supp. 1969). From 1947 until 1966, Philadelphia's
taxing authority was derived from "The Home Rule Tax Act of 1947." PA. STAT. ANN. tit, 53,
§ 6851 (1957). In 1965, "The Local Tax Enabling Act," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 6901-24
(Supp. 1969), was enacted for cities of the second and third class, boroughs, townships, and school
districts. The Act of 1947 was repealed and the Sterling Act, as amended, now covers cities of
the first class. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § I 5971 (Supp. 1969).
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1932 and authorized the City of Philadelphia to tax any non-property

sources not already taxed by the State. During its first year of
existence, the Philadelphia ordinance was partially invalidated- by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held that the exemption of the

first 1,000 dollars of income for each taxpayer was in violation of the
State constitution's uiiiformity requirement.10 In 1939, Philadelphia

enacted a new tax ordinance which has served as a model for many
cities since that time. This tax was imposed as a payroll tax which

applied to all earnings in the form of wages, salaries, commissions, and
other forms of compensation for personal services earned within the
city. No exemptions or deductions were allowed. Although partnerships
and unincorporated business associations were subject to the tax,
corporations were excluded, since they were taxed by the state and were
beyond the power of city taxation under the Sterling Act.
Following World War II, a large number of municipalities
instituted the income tax as an additional source of urgently needed
revenue. In 1946, Toledo, Ohio, imposed an income tax on individuals,
corporations, and unincorporated business associations. Since that
date, Toledo and numerous other Ohio cities have enacted the income
tax under the home rule. provisions of the Ohio Constitution.1

Municipal income taxes next appeared in Kentucky, where Paducah in
1947, and Louisville in 1948, adopted an occupational license tax,

which was measured on the basis of net income. 2 In 1948 St. Louis
became the first city in Missouri to enact an earnings tax based on

income." Kansas City adopted the tax in 1964 under specific legislative
10. Butcher v. City of Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 497, 6 A.2d 298 (1938). For a discussion of
the Philadelphia experience, see Phillips, Philadelphia's Income Tax After Twenty Years, II
NAT'L TAX J. 241 (1958).
I1. Article XVIII, § 3 of the Ohio constitution gives municipalites the authority to
exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce other regulations "not in
conflict with general laws." This section has been interpreted to allow municipal occupational
taxes as long as they are not pre-empted by the State. Marion Foundry Co. v. Landes, 112 Ohio
St. 166. 147 N.E. 302 (1925). Article XVIII, § 13 grants the State the authority to limit
municipal taxing powers. Angell v. Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950). The taxing
power of Ohio cities is limited to a 1% rate unless approved by 55% of the voters at a general
election or 60% at a special election. "Municipal Income Tax Act," OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 718.01 (Baldwin 1964).
12. The Kentucky cities have imposed the municipal income tax under the guise of an
occupational license tax as authorized by the Kentucky Constitution which allows the General
Assembly to delegate to municipal corporations the power "to impose and collect license fees on
. . . franchises, trades, occupations and professions." Ky. CONST., § 181. See City of Louisville
v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W.2d 248 (1948). Kentucky cities have direct authority to tax the
ificome from corporations. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 68.180, 91.200, 91.280 (1969).
13. The St. Louis income tax, termed an earnings tax, is authorized under a state statute
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authority"4 and remains the only other Missouri city to impose the
income tax. Subsequently, Gadsden, Alabama, imposed a license tax'5
that determined liability by measuring earnings within the city.
The eleven Michigan cities which impose the income tax are fairly
recent additions to the list. Detroit and Hamtramck first adopted the
tax in 1962 under the home rule provisions of the Michigan statutes."'
In 1964, the Michigan Legislature passed the City Income Tax Act 7
which now serves as a uniform ordinance for all Michigan cities. In
1966, New York City, under specific legislative authority,' 8 enacted a
comprehensive income tax covering residents, non-residents,
unincorporated associations, and corporations. New York's tax is the
most detailed and complete tax passed to date. In the same year,
Baltimore imposed a tax under legislation authorizing each Maryland
county and the City of Baltimore to adopt an income tax as a 20 to
50 percent surtax upon the state income tax liability." The Baltimore
tax which was recently raised to 50 percent of the state income tax, is
unique -sinceit is collected by the state and remitted to the city.2 '
empowering cities of more than 700,000 population to enact a tax on salaries, wages,
commissions, and other compensations earned by residents and non-residents for work performed
in the city. The city is also authorized to tax net profits of corporations earned from activities
within the city and net profits of unincorporated business associations. Mo. STAT. AN. § 92.110
(Supp. 1968).
14. Kansas City's earnings tax is authorized under Mo. STAT. AN-. § 92.210 (Supp. 1968).
15. The Gadsden tax was levied as a license fee for the privilege of engaging in a trade,
occupation, or profession within the city and was imposed at a rate of I" on all wages, salaries
and other compensation for personal services. The tax was upheld under ALA. Corm AN.,. tit.
37, §§ 733, 735 (1960), which authorizes municipal corporations to license businesses, trades, and
professions. Estes v. City of Gadsden, 266 Ala. 166, 94 So. 2d 744 (1957). Gadsden remains the
only Alabama city to impose an income tax.
16. Home rule cities are authorized to provide for "laying and collecting rents, tolls and
excises." MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 5.2082 (1949). See Dooley v. City of Detroit, 370 Mich. 194, 121
N.W.2d 724 (1963).
17. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3194 (Supp. 1969). Individual and corporate income taxes are
now imposed under this ordinance in th following cities: Battle Creek, Detroit, Flint, Grand
Rapids, Hamtra'mck, Highland Park, Lansing, Lapeer, Pontiac, Port Huron, and Saginaw.
18. "City Corporate Business and City Unincorporated Business Income Tax," N.Y. SLss.
LAWS ch. 772 (McKinney 1966) (codified at N.Y. GEN. CITY App. §§ 1-149 (McKinney 1968));
"City Personal Income Tax on Residents," N.Y. SEss. LAWS ch. 773 (McKINNY 1966) (codified
at N.Y. GEN. CITY §§ 25-a to -c (McKinney 1968)); "City Earnings Tax on Non-Residents,"
N.Y. SEss. LAWS ch. 774 (McKinney 1966) (codified at N.Y. GE.. CITY §§ 25-m to -0
(McKinney 1968)).
19. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 283(d) (Supp. 1968). Another statute now requires all
counties and the City of Baltimore to enact an income tax of at least 20. of the state income
tax liability. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 323 (Supp. 1968).
20. Michigan recently enacted a statute allowing the state to collect and administer the city
income taxes and remit the proceeds less 2% for administration costs. MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 53194(8) (Supp. 1969).
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Two other cities which recently imposed the income tax are
experiencing legal difficulties. The Colorado Supreme Court held a

Denver tax invalid under the state constitution. 21 Likewise, San
Francisco's levy of a one percent tax on non-resident earnings withir

the City has been held invalid by a county superior court in
California.

22

B.

GeneralProvisions

Because of the need for a large source of revenue, and because of

limited administrative facilities, most cities have imposed an income
tax at a flat rate on a simply computed tax base. Although nonresidents are taxed in all cities but Baltimore and a few small towns
in Pennsylvania, the tax base for non-residents is always limited to
salaries and other compensation earned within the taxing

municipality's jurisdiction. Most cities limit the tax base to "earned"
income, but a minority includes interest, capital gains, dividends, and

rental income. Generally, cities do not allow personal exemptions or
deductionsyt All cities, except those in Michigan and the two Kentucky

cities of Mayfield and Middlesboro, impose an income tax on
unincorporated business associations.24 Most cities tax the proprietor
of a wholly owned business as an individual, rather than the firm, on

income earned within the city.25

Prior to examining the details of the existing ordinances in

particular cities, the different forms in which the tax may be imposed
should be noted: (1) a flat rate imposed on earned income without

allowances for exemptions or deductions;26 (2) a progressive rate
imposed on earned income without allowances for exemptions or
21. The Denver earnings tax was held to be in violation of Art. X, § 17 of the Colorado
constitution which gives the state the exclusive power to impose income taxes. City and County
of Denver v. Duffey Storage & Moving Co., 450 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1969).
22. County of Alameda v. City of San Francisco (Sonoma Co. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 1968).
23. All state and local income taxes, however, are allowed as deductions from the adjusted
gross income under the federal income tax. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 164.
24. TAX FOUNDATION. INC., CITY INCOME TAXES 13 (1967).
25. Id. at 21.
26. This structure offers a maximum amount of revenue with low administrative costs, since
a large percentage of the tax is withheld by employers. The main drawback of this tax is its
regressiveness due to the disallowance of personal exemptions, the flat rate, and the exclusion of
unearned income. With maximum rates usually limited to 2%, however, there is little tax inequity,
even as to low-income groups. This tax is used by the Kentucky, Missouri, Alabama, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania cities.
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deductions; 27 (3) a flat rate imposed on all types of income without
allowances for exemptions or deductions; 28 (4) a progressive rate
imposed on all income without allowances for exemptions or

deductions; 2 (5) a flat rate imposed on all income with allowances for
exemptions and deductions; 30 (6) a progressive rate imposed on all

income with allowances for exemptions and deductions;" and (7) a
2
3
combination of several structures

C.

Rate

Eighty percent of the cities imposing an income tax have flat rates
which apply to residents and non-residents. Although in some cities the

rates are less for non-residents, the majority imposes the same rates on
residents and non-residents.3 3 Most Ohio cities apply a one percent rate
27. The progressive rate increases administrative costs because refunds or assessments for
additional liability are often required; however, the employers still carry the great bulk of
administration siice the tax is largely paid through the withholding process. There are no cities
that use this tax structure.
28. This tax is more equitable than those which do not include unearned income, since a
much larger percentage of total income for the higher income groups is unearned. This tax
structure is not in use at the present time.
29. As in the third possibility, the greater degree of fairness offered to the low-income
taxpayer would seem to offset the increased administrative costs.
30. This tax structure is actually progressive even with the flat rate because the allowance
for exemptions and deductions decreases the taxpayers' effective rate of tax below the stated rate.
Also, the high income groups are taxed on the basis of their ability to pay, since interest, capital
gains, dividends, and rental income are included. This type of tax is used by the Michigan cities
allowing a $600 exemption for the taxpayer, his spouse, and dependents; however, no personal
deductions are allowed.
31. This method is used by New York City and Baltimore. It offers the greatest degree of
progressivity combined with the highest cost of administration. One of the greatest drawbacks
with this tax structure, which is styled after the federal income tax, is the reduction in revenue
due to the allowance of exemptions, deductions, and low rates for low income groups. This factor
would seem to be outweighed by the fairness of the system. Baltimore has minimized
administrative costs by having the state collect the tax. For New York's proposal of a similar
administration, see note 58 infra. Michigan allows its cities to contract for state collection. See
note 20 supra.
32. This last alternative, which involves a combination of several possibilities, seems to have
the highest prospects. See notes 230-245 infra and accompanying text. The local income tax can
be coordinated with either the state or federal income tax, with collection and administration at
either the local, state, or federal level. Under this structure, the taxpayer would compute his local
tax liability as a percentage (surtax) of his tax liability to the higher level of government.
Alternatively, the local rate could be applied to the taxable income as computed on the state or
federal return. This sytem has two advantages: (I) administrative costs are reduced; and (2) the
taxpayer computes his taxable income once for state, federal, and local purposes. Baltimore,
which has adopted a state collection with liability imposed as a surtax upon the state tax, is the
only city to use this alternative.
33. Only one city, Williamsport, Pennsylvania, taxes non-residents (11-) at a greater rate
than residents (0.5%). TAX FOUNDATION. INC.. supra note 24, at 13.
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on all compensation earned by non-residents within the city. Residents
are taxed on all compensation earned within or without the city, as well
as commissions for personal service. The one percent rate also applies
to all net profits of unincorporated businesses derived from activities
within the city. Resident partners of unincorporated businesses,
however, are liable for earnings outside the city.31
The Louisville occupational license tax is imposed at a rate of 1.25
percent on salaries, wages, and compensation for services performed
within the city. The Louisville tax also includes net profits of all
3
businesses, professions, and other activities conducted within the city.
The Michigan cities under the "City Income Tax Act" impose a rate
of one percent on residents and five-tenths of one percent on nonresidents. " Detroit, by special legislative action imposes a rate of two percent on residents until December 31, 1970. Unlike the Ohio cities, Michigan residents must include dividends, interest, capital gains, and rental
income in their tax base. The two Missouri cities imposing the tax, St.
Louis and Kansas City, apply rates of one and one-half of one percent,
respectively, to all earned income of residents and income earned within
the city by non-residents. Resident partners are also taxed on all profits
from unincorporated businesses. Furthermore, unincorporated
associations are taxed on net profits earned within the city. Gadsden,
Alabama, applies a two percent rate to all income earned within the
city.
In Pennsylvania, there is some variance as to the rates applied.
Philadelphia, under the Sterling Act, imposes a rate of two percent.
Other cities, townships, boroughs, and school districts, however,
impose a maximum rate of one percent, as required under "'The Local
Tax Enabling Act. '37 By limiting the tax base to earned income of
individuals and unincorporated business associations, Pennsylvania
cities do not tax interest, dividends, capital gains, or rental income.
The only cities to apply progressive rates are New York and
Baltimore. The rates for New York residents vary from four-tenths of
one percent on income less than 1,000 dollars to two percent on excess
income over 30,000 dollars. The residents' tax base is their federal
34. CCH STATE TAX GUIDE T 15-725 to -735, at 1597-1600 (1969) (citing municipal
ordinances).
35. CCH STATE TAX GUIDE * 15-463, at 1573 (1969).
36. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3194(21) (Supp. 1969).
37. CCH STATE TAX GUIDE T 15-780, at 1607-2 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6908
(Supp. 1969).
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adjusted gross income with allowances for exemptions and deductions3
Commuters to New York City pay a flat one-quarter of one percent
on wages and salaries earned within the city, and self-employed nonresidents pay a flat three-eights of one percent on earnings within the
city. 9 Non-residents are not allowed personal exemptions or
deductions, but they may exclude from 1,000 to 3,000 dollars on
incomes less than 30,000 dollars. 40 New York City also imposes an
unincorporated business tax of four percent on the income of
unincorporated associations. Allowances for deductions and
exemptions are identical with the New York State income tax
provisions; therefore, all businesses receive a 5,000 dollar exemption.
If the tax liability of an unincorporated business is 100 dollars or less,
it pays no tax. If the tax liability is greater than 100 dollars, the credit
is the amount by which 200 dollars exceeds the tax owed (thus giving no
credit for tax liability greater than 200 dollars).4
Baltimore residents pay a rate of 50 percent of their state income
tax liability. The progressive state rate is as follows: two percent on the
first 1,000 dollars; three percent on the second 1,000 dollars; four
percent on the third 1,000 dollars; and five percent on all amounts in
excess of 3,000 dollars. The state taxable income is computed from the
federal adjusted income, thus including dividends, rents, interests, and
capital gains4 2
D.

Tax Base

As previously noted, all cities include in the tax base of residents
and non-residents salaries, wages, commissions, and compensation for
personal services earned within the city. Residents in most cities must
also include salaries and Compensation for services earned outside the
taxing jurisdiction, but are usually not required to include other forms
of income. Baltimore, New York, and the Michigan cities are the only
municipalities which include unearned income in the tax base of

38. N.Y. SESS. LAWS ch. 773, § 25-a(§ 3) (McKinney 1966); CCH STATE TAX GUIDL
15-691, at 1593-2 (1969).
39. The non-resident tax base also includes income from real or tangible personal property
located within the city.
40. N.Y. SESS. LAWS ch. 774, § 25-m(§ 2) (McKinney 1966); CCH STATE TAX GUIDE
'15-692, at 1593-3 (1969). Non-residents may deduct the New York City tax on their New York
State and federal income tax returns, but residents may deduct city taxes only on their federal
returns.

41.

CCH

42.

MD. ANN.

STATE TAX GUIDE
CODE

15-693, at 1593-5 (1969).

art. 81, § 288 (Supp. 1968).
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residents. By limiting the tax to earned income and excluding interest,
dividends, capital gains, or rental income, taxpayers in the higher tax
brackets pay proportionately less than the lower)ncome groups, who
derive a large percentage of income from salaries.
In recent years, interest and dividends have amounted to merely
three percent of the federal adjusted gross income, while capital gains
and rent have been less, averaging under two and one percent,
respectively.43 By excluding these sources from the tax base, cities have
exempted a relatively small source of revenue and have avoided many
costly administrative problems. When the tax is viewed from the
standpoint of seeking the most equitable tax structure, however, these
results strongly favor the inclusion of this revenue source in the tax
base. For taxpayers with a federal adjusted gross income of 10,000 to
15,000 dollars, dividends, interest, and capital gains amount to one and
seven-tenths and one and three-tenths percent respectively. Above the
15,000 dollar adjusted gross income .level, these sources of income
become increasingly important. For taxpayers in the 15,000 to 20,000
dollar bracket, dividends are five and one-fifth percent, interest four
and one-tenth percent, and capital gains three and three-tenths percent.
For those with 20,000 to 50,000 dollars adjusted gross income,
dividends amount to seventeen and seven-tenths percent, interest eight
and one-tenth percent, and capital gains ten and two-fifths percent. 4
Even though the inclusion of these sources of income which cannot be
withheld requires procedures for discovering, checking, and verifying the
taxpayers' returns, they should be included to increase the fairness and
equity of the municipal income tax system. As can be seen from the
tax base, the tax becomes much less regressive when these sources are
included. When exemptions and deductions are allowed, the tax
becomes progressive, even with a flat rate.
E. Deductionsand Exemptions
The problem of defining the tax base in connection with
exemptions and deductions is subject to great variance among
municipalities. The use of liberal exemptions and deductions, even when
combined with a flat rate, can make the tax progressive and adjust the
burden of tax liability according to the amount of income and the size
of the taxpayer's family. In order to accomplish this objective,
municipalities must allow liberal exemptions and deductions to various
43.
44.

TAX FOUNDATION. INC.. supra note 24, at 17-18.

Id.
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classes of individuals and for certain types of income. It is estimated,
however, that allowance of federal-type deductions and exemptions
would decrease'the local income tax revenues biy as much as 50 percent
unless the rates were increased to offset the decreased tax base. 5
All cities have exempted certain types of income from the tax base.
Those cities following federal-type provisions for adjusted gross
income, such as New York and Baltimore, permit the same exemptions
allowed under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which include the
following: interest on those United States obligations and bonds which

are considered exempt from state tax;46 workmen's compensation
benefits for injuries or sickness; pensions for injury or service in United
States armed forces; and certain accident and health benefits." Those
cities not using federal-type provisions for adjusted gross income as the
tax base are fairly uniform in the type of income excluded. For
example, the Michigan cities exempt the following sources of income:
gifts and bequests; interest from federal or state obligations; proceeds

from insurance, annuities, pensions, and retirement benefits; military
pay; welfare relief, unemployment, and workmen's compensation
benefits.48

The major problem with allowance of either personal exemptions
or deductions, beside the loss of revenue, is the increase in
administrative costs. In 1966, Detroit, which includes unearned income
but allows personal exemptions and itemized business expense

deductions, was forced to remit tax refunds to 48 percent of its
taxpayers. In large part, this additional expense can be attributed to
45. R. SIGAFOOS, supra note 5, at 109.
46. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 103. New York requires that interest on obligations of
states other than New York be added to the federal adjusted gross income which excludes such
obligations. Also federal income taxes are not deductible under the New York City income taxes.
N.Y. SEss. LAWS ch. 773, § 25-a(§ 12) (McKinney 1966); CCH STATE TAX GUIDE
15-682,
at 1584-5 (1969).
47. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 104, 105.
48. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3194(42) (Supp. 1969); CCH STATE TAX GUIDE
15-543, at
1581 (1969). Cleveland's exemptions include: military pay; income from tax exempt property or
activities of religious, charitable, and educational institutions; poor relief; unemployment
insurance benefits, pensions, annuities, and gratuities; alimony; personal earnings of persons under
18 years of age; compensation for personal injuries or property damage; and interest, dividends,
and other income from intangibles. Id.
15-726a, at 1597-3 (citing Codified Ord. of City of
Cleveland, Ord. No. 256-68 § 115.0501). Ohio cities are required by statute to include and
exclude certain types of income. For example, compensation for personal services for individuals
over 18 and net profit from businesses and professions must be included in the income tax base.
No city is allowed to tax military pay, pensions, or allowances, and income from religious,
scientific, educational, fraternal, literary, and charitable institutions is generally exempt. 0111o
REV. CODE ANN.

§ 718.01 (Baldwin 1964).

NOTES

1969]

1323

the exemptions and deductions. 9 One procedure which decreases
administrative expense is the allowance of a flat exclusion. For
example, under the New York City commuter tax, commuters exclude
1,000 to 3,000 dollars on incomes up to 30,000 dollars.
Most cities allowing exemptions, however, utilize a specific
exemption for the taxpayer, his spouse, and his dependents. Michigan
cities, as well as New York, allow 600 dollar exemptions; Baltimore
allows 800 dollar exemptions. Personal exemptions are not permitted
in Kentucky, Missouri, Alabama, Ohio, and Pennsylvania cities.
New York and Baltimore are the only cities which allow personal
deductions. New York residents may take the federal itemized
deductions as adjusted for the State income tax, or a standard
deduction of ten percent of their adjusted gross income or 1,000
dollars, whichever is less." The Maryland state income tax, which is
used by Baltimore, allows itemized federal deductions, less income
taxes imposed by any other state or city. In lieu of itemized deductions,
residents of Maryland may take a ten percent standard deduction or
500 dollars, whichever is lessl
F.

Double Taxation and Reciprocity

Taxpayers who live in one jurisdiction and work in another face
the problem of tax liability in both jurisdictions. Where both
jurisdictions impose income taxes, there have been problems in
adjusting the liability between the two cities, since both provide services
and need revenue. The answer in most areas has been the allowance
of tax credits for amounts paid to other jurisdictions. One of the
greatest drawbacks to any system of tax credits is the increased
administrative burden, requiring a more complicated tax form and
often necessitating refunds. Employers have increased difficulty in
large, fragmentized, urban areas because they must determine the
credits applicable to each employee.
Urban areas may treat taxes paid in different jurisdictions by one
of four procedures5 2 First, the right to tax may be given to either the
city of residence or the city of employment, but not both. States which
permit only certain cities to impose the tax and allow no credits use a
49. Warren, Detroit's Experience, 28 ACAD. POL. ScI. PROc. 452, 454 (1968).
50. N.Y. SESS. LAWS ch. 773, § 25-a(§§ 13-15) (McKinney 1966); CCH STATE TAX GUIDE
15-691, at 1593-2 (1969).
51.
MD. CODE ANN. art. 81, §§ 281-82 (Supp. 1968); CCH STATE TAX GUIDE T 15-505,
at 1577-3 (1969).
52. Taylor, LocalIncome TaxesAfter Twenty-one Years, 15 NAT'LTAX J. 113, 122 (1962).
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variation of this first form. New York, Baltimore, St. Louis, Kansas
City, and several Ohio cities allow no credits, thus giving priority to
the place of employment (residents having no problems of double
taxation). By statute, Philadelphia is the only Pennsylvania city which
does not give credits for taxes paid in the place of residence." Secondly,
the city of residence is allowed to tax all earned income except that
which is taxed at the place of employment. In this situation, the city
of residence allows a credit for all taxes paid to the city of employment.
The Michigan cities"' and those whose residents work in Philadelphia
employ this type of credit.
Thirdly, priority is given to the city of residence. Under this
method, which is used in the Pennsylvania cities other than
Philadelphia, the city of employment taxes the non-resident to the
extent that he is not taxed by the city of residence. This structure has
caused a proliferation of income taxes in the smaller communities
surrounding the central cities, resulting in sizeable decrease in the
central city's revenue from the tax. Presently, voluntary reciprocal tax
agreements may be negotiated in each large urban area." The
Cleveland' area provides a good example of this arrangement. The city
of Cleveland grants a credit to non-residents who live in Cuyahoga or
an adjoining county in the amount of 25 percent of the Cleveland tax
or 25 percent of the other city's tax, whichever is less. This credit to
non-residents is given only where the other city grants a similar credit
to Cleveland residents. Cleveland residents, who are subject to the tax
in the city where they are employed, may claim a 75 percent credit
against the Cleveland tax if the city of employment grants a similar
credit to its residents who are subject to the Cleveland tax." Under
this system, the place of employment taxes 75 percent of the earnings
while the place of residence taxes 25 percent, thus avoiding double
taxation.
53. For the Pennsylvania tax credits provision, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6914 (Supp.
1969).
54. Under the Michigan uniform ordinance, the credit allowed by the city of residence for
taxes paid at the place of employment cannot exceed that amount of tax which the city of
residence would have assessed if the taxpayer had been a non-resident. MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 5.3194(75) (Supp. 1969); CCH STATE TAX GUIDE T 15-543, at 1580 (1969).
55. This method is used by Ohio cities. For a good discussion of the Ohio situation, see S.
SACKS & W. HELLMUTH. FINANCING GOVERNMIENT IN A METROPOLITAN AREA 245 (1961).
56. CCH STATE TAX GUIDE
15-726a, at 1597-3 (1969) (citing Codified Ord. of City of
Cleveland, Ord. No. 256-68, §§ 115.1901-02). Toledo has an arrangement similar to Cleveland's,
except that Toledo allows non-residents to credit 50r of either tax, whichever is less. The Toledo
credits are also limited to taxpayers in cities offering reciprocal credits. Id.
15-733, at 199
(citing Toledo Ordinance No. 597-58, § 15.).
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The effective rate of tax is lowered by a tax credit arrangement.
In such areas as Pennsylvania and Ohio, where a large number of
jurisdictions impose income taxes, the problems arising from
reciprocity and income allocation may become severe. In light of this,
a municipal income tax which is collected and administered at either
the state or federal level might provide a-solution.
G.

Administrationof the PersonalIncome Tax

1. General Scope.- In assessing the value of any tax, the total
revenue-producing capabilities must be compared with the costs and
burdens of administration, since both affect the collecting agency and
the taxpayer. Experience since 1939 has proven that the municipal
income tax may be administered with reasonable efficiency and without
unbearable costs of compliance to businesses and individuals. The
greatest single factor contributing to the successful imposition and
administration of the income tax is the withholding requirement, which
is used by all cities and accounts for 70 to 80 percent of the total
revenue.
Although it is difficult to compute and compare the actual costs
of administration in the various cities, several generalizations can be
made. The tax rate is inversely proportional to the cost of collection
as a percentage of total collections. A tax levied at one or two percent
can be collected 'as efficiently as a tax imposed at a five-tenths of one
percent rate. Likewise, the complexity of the tax base is directly
proportional to the costs of administration. 57 Municipalities which include all sources of income within the residents' tax base necessarily
face higher administrative costs due to the added enforcement measures required: e.g., discovering, checking, and verifying the amounts
reported. The allowance of deductiors, exemptions, and tax credits
for payments to other jurisdictions increases administrative burdens.
The jurisdictions allowing these items are often required to give tax
refunds to a substantial number of taxpayers.
One factor which directly affects the administration of the tax is
the economic complexity of the community and the location of the
57. Mayor Lindsay of New York City recently asked the state legislature to approve a plan
to excuse from Filing any resident earning $6,000 or less in wages and not more than $200 in
other income per year. Lindsay stated that the amount already withheld from such persons by
employers is so close to their final tax liability that the administrative effort to collect the
difference is not justified. Approximately 1.5 million persons would fall into this "excused
groups," resulting in an estimated savings to the city of $1.5 million. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1967,

at 1,col. 6.
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large employers. 58 Since withholding is required of only those
employers within the taxing jurisdiction, the costs of administration are
increased if a large number of the city residents work outside the taxing
jurisdiction.
2. Actual Costs of Administration.-The average
cost-to-yield ratios vary from two to five percent, although it is
much higher for various smaller jurisdictions. 9 A study made in 1961
indicated that collection costs for the Pennsylvania cities were below
four percent in 53 percent of those jurisdictions collecting over 200,000
dollars. Costs for Pennsylvania cities collecting less than 200,000
dollars were less than four percent of total collections in only thirteen
to twenty-eight percent of the jurisdictions. Costs for cities collecting
over 200,000 dollars were four and four-tenths of one percent of total
collections, but this decreased to three and nine-tenths of one percent
when only the largest cities were tabulated.'"
Several small municipalities in the area of Williamsport,
Pennsylvania, pool administration costs through a central collection
agency responsible for collection and distribution of the revenues.'
Where several smaller taxing jurisdictions are within a larger taxing
jurisdiction, the larger may collect the tax and distribute it to the
smaller. Likewise, administrative costs may be decreased if the
municipal tax is imposed as a surtax upon the state income tax with
collection and distribution at the state level. This type of arrangement,
which is used in Baltimore, has apparently been successful.
III.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATE'INCOME TAXES

A.

GeneralStructure

Local corporate income taxes, which have become a significant
source of local revenues, are imposed by all cities using the personal
income tax, except those in Pennsylvania and the two Kentucky cities
of Mayfield and Middlesboro. For example, New York City, which
enacted the corporate income tax in 1966 to replace its gross receipts
tax, realized 232 million dollars from the tax in 1967, as opposed to
163 million dollars from its personal income tax. The municipal
58. OHIO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE. STATISTICS ON MUNICIPAL INCOME TAXES IN OHIO (1967).
59. For example, in 1954, Maumee, Ohio. with a population of 5,500, had costs of 8,21t
of the total collections. R. SIGAFOOS. supra note 5, at 60.
60. TAX FOUNDATION. INC.. supra note 24, at 24.
61. R. SIGAFOOS. supra note 5, at 50-51; see notes 255-56 infra and accompanying text.
62. Governmental officials in New York City contend that state collection of the income
tax could save the city $5 million without substantial increase in costs to the state. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 8, 1967, at 66, col. 4.
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corporate income tax was first adopted by Toledo, Ohio, in 1946.11 St.
Louis became the first Missouri city to adopt the tax in 1948, and was
followed by Kansas City in 1964.64 Louisville, in 1948, was the first of
eight Kentucky cities to enact the corporate income tax. 5 The next
state in which the tax appeared was Michigan, where it was adopted
by Detroit and Hamtramck in 1962.66 New York" and Baltimore' are
the most recent cities to impose the corporate income tax and remain
the only cities in their states with statutory authority to adopt the tax.
The corporate income tax is imposed by all cities at a flat rate
upon net income, which is usually defined in terms of net corporate
income under the Internal Revenue Code with some adjustments in
each state. In contrast with the federal provisions loss carryovers,
income from foreign securities, and income from certain types of
government securities are frequently disallowed. Federal income tax
paid is not a deduction except in New York.6 9 In addition to the
deductions allowed by the Internal Revenue Service, supplementary
depreciation allowances, expenditures for air and water pollution
prevention, and other specific expenditures encouraged to achieve
70
certain municipal objectives are frequently permitted
The Ohio cities generally impose a one percent rate7 ' on the
adjusted federal tax base, which is substantially modified by
adjustments 2 Cities in Kentucky and Michigan use the federal tax base
with minor modifications. Detroit, under specific legislative authority,63. By 1964, 81 local governments in Ohio had adopted the corporate income tax. H.R.
REP. No. 1480, supra note 4, at 446. The power to impose corporate income taxes in Ohio is
based upon the constitutional grant to local governments empowering them to exercise all powers
of local self-government not in conflict with State statutes. See note I I supra.
64. St. Louis and Kansas City have direct authority to tax the net profits earned by all
corporations as a result of work done, services performed or rendered, and business or other
activities conducted in the city. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 92.110, 210 (Supp. 1968).
65. The Kentucky statutes grant different taxing powers to different size cities. First class
cities are authorized to impose "license fees" on businesses based upon net profits. Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 91.200 (1969).
66. Michigan cities now impose the corporate income tax under "The City Income Tax
Act," MICH. STAT. AN\. § 5.3194 (Supp. 1969).

67. See N.Y. SEss. LAWS ch. 772 (McKinney 1966).
68. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 283 (Supp. 1968).
69. CCH STATETAX GUIDE
10-694, at 1101-02 (1969).
70. TAX FOUNDATION. INC., supra note 24, at 21.
71. The following Ohio cities with populations over 150,000 impose a 17 rate: Akron,
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, and Dayton. Toledo and Youngstown have a 1-I/21'( rate.
CCH STATE TAX GUIDE 'r 10-000, at 1032 (1969).
72. Most Ohio cities do not allow deductions for federal or local income taxes and limit
deductions to ordinary and necessary business expenses. Id.
10-725, at 1106-11 (citing
municipal ordinances). Ohio does not impose a tax on net incomes.
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imposes a rate of two percent. All other Michigan cities under the
uniform City Income Tax Act apply a rate of one percent. 3 The rate
in Louisville and Jefferson County is one and three-quarters of one
percent for resident corporations and one and one-quarter of one
percent for non-resident corporations." St. Louis and Kansas City
impose rates of one percent and one-half of one percent, respectively;
however, neither city uses the federal definitions of net corporate
income.7 5 The corporate income tax in New York City is the most
detailed and comprehensive of any to date. The New York rate of five
and one-half of one percent which is more than twice that of any other
city, is imposed on the federal tax base as adjusted for the state
corporate income tax.7 New York also has special income tax
ordinances covering financial corporations, insurance companies, and
77
utility and transportation companies.
B. Allocation of Income and Municipal Nonenjbrcenent
One problem unique to the corporate side of municipal income
taxes is the determination of income subject to the tax.78 This problem
arises when a multi-state or multi-municipality business is involved in
sales, production, or other activities in several municipalities within the
same or different states. The tax liability of such a corporation may
be affected by three different sets of laws: (I) the federal constitution
and federal statutory law; (2) relevant state law; and (3) the provisions
of the municipal ordinances.
The United States Supreme Court has prohibited states and their
political subdivisions from imposing a privilege or franchise type tax
upon corporations exclusively engaged in interstate commerce.75 Cities
and states, however, are allowed to impose direct taxes upon corporate
net income fairly allocable to the taxing jurisdiction." In addition to
73. The Detroit tax is effective until December 31, 1970. MICH. STAT. ANN., § 5.3194(21)
(Supp. 1969).
74. Louisville imposes a 1 % license fee on net profits of corporations. CCH STATE TAX
GUIDE
10-463, at 1079 (1969).
75. St. Louis imposes the tax on corporate income "remaining after deduction from the
gross profits or earnings the necessary expenses of operation exclusive of payments of federal or
state income taxes." ST. Louis, Mo.. REv. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 145.020 (1960).
76. The New York City tax is imposed under three alternative rates; the corporation being
liable for that rate which produces the greatest amount of tax. N.Y. SEss. LAws ch. 772, § 4
(McKinney 1966); CCH STATE TAX GUIDE
10-694, at II01(1969).
77. N.Y. SEss. LAws ch. 772, §§ 11,41,61 (McKinney 1966).
78. For complete discussion, see H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 4. at 451-55.
79. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
80. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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these requirements under the interstate commerce clause of the
Constitution, in 1959 the Congress passed Public Law 86-2728, which
was designed to impose minimum standards for state and local
imposition of income taxes. The statute prohibits states and their
political subdivisions from imposing net income taxes on income
derived within the state from interstate commerce where the only
business activities conducted within the state by the business or its
independent contractors are limited to the solicitation of orders for the
sale of tangible personal property. If the corporation is subject to
taxation by the state, then it will be subject to taxation by the city, even
2
though its only contact with the city is the solicitation of orders!
The state statutes and local tax enabling provisions seldom provide
jurisdictional requirements as to the degree of business activity required
before a corporation may be subjected to the municipal income tax.
For example, the Ohio cities impose the income tax under broad
constitutional provisions which have no specific nexus requirements.
The Michigan uniform ordinance contains specific requirements for
allocation of income subject to the municipal tax, but does not provide
jurisdictional guidelines for determing what income is subject to the
tax. 4 The enabling statutes in Kentucky and Missouri grant general
authority to tax net profits of business activities conducted- within the
city without jurisdictional limitations.
The municipal ordinances, which are similar to the state statutes,have broad liability provisions that generally subject to tax liability all
firms conducting any activity within the taxing jurisdiction. The Ohio
municipal ordinances, however, determine tax liability according to the
attribution of income rules."6
The inadequacy of state and local laws concerning taxing
authority contributes to the confusion in determing the tax liability of
81. 15U.S.C.§§ 381-84(1964).
82. H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 4, at 454.
83. Id. at 451.
84. "The tax shall apply on the taxable net profits of a corporation doing business in the
city, being levied on such part of the taxable net profits as is earned by the corporation as a result
of work done, services rendered and other business activities conducted in the city, as determined
in accordance with this ordinance." MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3194(24) (Supp. 1969). The Michigan
uniform ordinance incorporates 15 U.S.C. 381 (1964). MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3194(15) (Supp.
1969).
85. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91.200 (1963) authorizes first class cities to impose license fees
on "the net profits of all businesses, professions or occupations from activities 'conducted in the
city ...... Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92.110 (Supp. 1968) authorizes St. Louis to impose an
earnings tax "on the net profits earned by all corporations as the result of work done or services
performed or rendered and business or other activities conducted in the city."
86. H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 4, at 452.
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multi-branch corporations. The result of broad assertions of liability
is to impose municipal tax liability on every firm which merely solicits
orders within the state boundaries. Therefore, when faced with unclear
municipal income tax liability, the corporations have in numerous
instances ignored the tax. The House Special Subcommittee on State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce has concluded that "[tihe
combination of sweeping assertions of jurisdiction and inadequate
enforcement, which at the State level may produce taxpayer
7
uncertainty, at the local level appears to produce only indifference.""
Based upon a series of questionnaires sent to corporations and various
city tax administrations, the House Subcommittee further concluded
that:
[M]ost corporations do not file income tax returns with any local jurisdictions.
Among those which do file, most file in only one jurisdiction, with widespread
filing extremely rare. The experience of the companies studied suggests that
for almost all but the largest corporations, local income tax filing is limited to
the location of a place of business. Filing by a small corporation in any other
locality is very unusual.

Once it is determined that a corporation is subject to the
municipal income tax, the problem of allocation of income arises.
Corporations which do all of their business within the taxing
jurisdiction do not have the opportunity to allocate income. Where only
the major portion of the income is earned within the jurisdiction,
allocation or division of income may also be denied."' For example, the
St. Louis ordinance allows allocation of income only when it is derived
from "activities -. . . conducted both within and . . . without the
city." 9 0 Since no definition of "activity" is provided under this
ordinance, there is some doubt as to how much or what proportion of
activity must be carried on outside the city before allocation will be
allowed.
The allowance of allocation or division of income is usually done
by one of several methods. The first method is separate accounting
which allows the business to segregate items of income and cost for
activities within a particlar municipality. The tax is imposed only upon
that amount of net profits shown to be derived within the city. At the
present time, separate accounting is used or allowed to some extent in
all jurisdictions except Louisville and Lexington, Kentucky, and
Portland, Oregon."
Id. at 470.
88. Id. at 467.
89. Id. at 456.
87.

90.
91.

ST. Louis. Mo.. REV. Cono ORDINANCES § 145.030 (1960).
H.R. REP. No. 1480, supra note 4, at459.
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If separate accounting is not used, some type of formula or ratio
determines the amount of income earned within a particular city. The
most widespread method, at both the state and local levels, is the
"Massachusetts formula," which is based upon a simple average of the
following three ratios: sales or gross receipts within the city as a
percent of total sales, property within the city as a percent of total
property of the corporation; and total wages, salaries, and
compensations for personal services paid within the city as a percent
of total compensation paid. The resulting average ratio or percent is
then applied to the corporation's total net income to determine the
amount of income subject to the municipal tax. While the Michigan,
Ohio, and Missouri cities use the "Massachusetts formula," 2 a few
cities use the "Pennsylvania formula," which is based upon an average
of three slightly different ratios: physical assets, gross receipts, and
payrolls. The last type of allocation formula is a two-factor ratio
composed of sales and payrolls. This ratio is used in all of the
3
Kentucky cities.1
One of the major problems concerning the use of any formula is
the city-to-city variation of the definitions of each factor within the
formula. A corporation doing business in several cities may be subject
to a variety of requirements for computing sales, including one or more
of the following: origin of sales, destination, sales office where made,
sales activity, or intra-city shipmentsY4 Likewise, the property factor
may be limited to real and tangible property owned by the corporation
or .include leased property. Variations in the use of different formulas
and in the definitions of the various factors within the formulas could
theoretically lead to a lesser or greater liability than is actually due,
thereby subjecting corporations to double taxation.15 Since a low
number of multi-city or multi-state firms file municipal income tax
returns, this problem does not appear to be troubling most
corporations at the present time. In addition to its finding that "few
of the taxpayers who are technically liable for . . . . [the corporate
income tax] file returns," the House Special Subcommittee also found
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
TAx FOUNDATION. INC., supra note 24, at 21-22.
"Although the existing local income taxes thus provide theoretical possibilities for

overtaxation and undertaxation, it seems improbable that serious inequities often result at the
local level today. The relatively small number of municipalities imposing net-income taxes, and
the relatively low rates at which these taxes are imposed, suggests that it would be a rare company
for which such overtaxation or undertaxation involved a significant amount of tax liability." H.R.
REP. No. 1480, supra note 4, at 473.
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that "[flor those that do file, the work involved is kept down by
disregarding required adjustments which are not expected to have a
significant effect on liability.""6
IV.

A.

LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUNICIPAL INCOME TAXATION

Fundamental Restrictions on Local Power to Levy a Municipal
Income Tax

I. Constitutionaland Statutory Prohibitions.-Although the
power of local governmental units to levy a municipal income tax is
hedged with several fundamental restrictions, the most formidable
takes the form of a specific constitutional or statutory prohibitions
against the imposition of a tax. If such prohibitions are present the levy
of a municipal income tax is impossible without constitutional
amendment or statutory reform. For example, both Florida and
Tennessee have prohibited the levy of local income taxes by express
constitutional amendment. 7 Express statutory prohibitions against the
municipal income tax are found in six states: Alaska, Kansas, North
Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin."
By expressly denying municipalities the power to levy an income
tax, these statutes give effect to a legislative determination that only
the state government should have the power to collect an income tax.
The State Legislature of Virginia, by the process of implication, has
interpreted the state constitution as reserving the power to tax incomes
to the state and not to municipalities. This interpretation has been
codified even though the constitution itself does not exclude
municipalities from taxing income. The Virginia legislature embodied
its interpretation in the following statutory language: "Incomes having
been segregated for state taxation only, no county, city, town or other
political subdivision of this State shall impose any tax or levy upon
incomes." 9 In its prohibition of the municipal income tax, the Kansas
legislature has disregarded a broad grant of municipal taxing power in
the state constitution. The Kansas constitution provides that cities
may:
96. Id. at 471.
97. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § II; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 9. These appear to be the
only two states presently prohibiting municipal income taxation by express constitutional
prohibition.
98. U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS REPORT. STATI:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL TAXING POWERS 86 (1962). See, e.g..
ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.290 (1962); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-140 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-247 (1965); 'VA. CODE ANN. § 58-80 (1969).
99. NVA.CODE ANN. § 58-80 (1969).
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determine their local affairs and government including the levying of taxes, excises,
fees, charges, and other exactions except when and as the levying of any tax,
excise, fee, charge, other exaction is limited or prohibited by enactment of the
legislature applicable uniformily to all cities of the same class.1'0

Apparently ignoring local revenue needs, the Kansas legislature has
prohibited not only the municipal income tax, but all major municipal

non-property taxes. 0t
Although express state interdiction is a formidable limitation on
municipal income taxing powers, 0 2 the large majority of the states

neither permit nor prohibit the levy of a municipal income tax by
express constitutional or statutory provision.'0 3
2. Specific Statutory Limitation.-A second restriction on local
taxing power is a specific limitation concomitantly imposed by the
state with the authorization of local non-property tax. In relation to

the municipal income tax, this restriction manifests itself in the various
provisions setting maximum rates or defining the scope of the tax base.

All cities which tax income under express statutory authorization, as
well as those which tax under a home rule power, are subject to this
restriction."'
3. The Application of Dillon's Rule.-Dillon's Rule presents a

different form of restriction on the general powers of municipal
taxation. As a rule of construction, it may be of particular importance
in those states in which there is no express statutory or constitutional

authorization for a municipal levy on income. Dillon's Rule is basically
a statement of the theory that state authorization is the source of all

municipal power. The Rule'is as follows: It is the general and
undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses,
and can exercise, the following powers, and no others: First, those
granted in express words; second, those necessarily orfairly implied in,
100. KAN. CONST. art. XII, § 5(b).
101. U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS REPORT. supra
note 98, at 87.
102. See notes 113-114 infra and accompanying text.
103. A survey of the states shows that the eight states mentioned in the above text have
some express constitutional or statutory prohibition against the municipal income tax. Of the
eight states where some form of municipal income taxation is now in force, only six of these have
express constitutional or statutory provision allowing the tax. In the other two, the tax is allowed
by judicial decision. See notes 9-19 supra and accompanying text.
104. As to cities taxing under express statutory authorization, note the restrictions in PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6908 (Supp. 1969) which sets the municipal income tax at one percent and
limits the over-all amount of revenue a city can raise. As to cities taxing under a home rule
-provision, note Ohio's restriction of the tax rate to no more than one percent. OHIO REV. CODE

§ 718.01 (1964). See notes I I &37 supra and accompanying text.
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or incident to, the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to

of the corporation-not simply
the declared objects and purposes
5
convenient but indispensable.'1
Since the large majority of states have no express statutory

authorization of the municipal income tax and virtually all state
constitutions delegate to the legislative branches the power to regulate
local taxation, Dillon's Rule would appear to preclude local

governments from taxing income on their own initiative. One authority
on municipal taxation has stated the effect of the combination of these
two factors as follows:
[L]ocal governments as creatures of the state, may tax that which constitutional
provision and state legislation authorize them to tax. By implication, what is
not authorized specifically is beyond their authority.""

Whether such specific authorization is indeed required seems to be an
open question. The problem becomes how specific must such
authorizatioh be? For example, if a state constitution simply gives to
cities the power to determine their local affairs and government and to
exercise all powers appropriate thereto, and there is no statutory

prohibition of such a tax, it appears that the second and/or third
components of Dillion's Rule might be invoked to defend a municipal
levy on income even in the absence of express statutory authority for
the tax. This argument would appear to be particularly applicable to

defend local income taxation by home rule cities. 107 Cities in Ohio and
Michigan, however, have levied an income tax for some time on the
theory that the power to make such a levy is implicit in general

enabling acts or home rule provisions.0 8 A consideration of the
experiences of these cities, indicates that the requirements of the second
component of Dillon's Rule may be fulfilled on the theory that the levy
105. The Rule was the product of Judge John F. Dillon, a prominent 19th Century
authority on municipal corporations. See J. DILLON. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 (Ist ed.
1872).
106. R. SIGAFOOS, supranote 5, at 9.
107. See E. STASON. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 42-45 (3d ed. 1959), for an example or
the broad grants of governmental power given to home rule cities.
108. A survey shows that over 60 Ohio cities have enacted a income tax under a home
rule provision of the Ohio constitution. See OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 3, 13. These taxes,
however, must be levied within certain statutory limits. The Ohio legislature has provided that
such a tax cannot be levied unless 55% of a city's voters approve of the tax in a general election
vote (60c are necessary in a special or primary vote). This act also limited the tax rate to no
more than one percent. OHIO REV. CODE § 718.01 (1964). Acting under a statutory provision
which grants to charter cities the power to levy -rents, tolls and excises," Detroit and
Hamtramik, Michigan, levied a tax on the gross incomes of all individuals and the net profits of
all businesses earning income in the cities. The tax applied to residents and non-residents alike.
See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.5082 (1949). For present Michigan authority, see note 17 supra.
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of a municipal income tax is impliedly authorized by home rule

provisions which are sufficiently broad." 9
Study reveals, however, that restrictive application of Dillon's
Rule far exceed more liberal applications. The. first component of the
Rule has often been interpreted by courts to prohibit municipalities
from levying the tax, in the absence of express authorization or very

sound grounds for implication. Indeed, it appears that the slightest
question as to the authority of a municipality to levy a particular tax

will suffice to invalidate it. The following case contains typically
illustrative language:
The authority to tax is not only a delegated authority conferred by the State, but
it is assumed that the State has given all it intended should be exercised, and the
grant, like that of all special and limited grants is to be strictly construed. Where
municipal authority to tax is doubtful, the doubt is to be resolved against the
0

tax."

B.

The Pre-emption Doctrine and its Effect on Municipal Income
Taxation
1. A Statement of the Doctrine.- Growing out of the concept of
state sovereignty over all subordinate political units, the doctrine of
pre-emption has long been a most formidable barrier to the evolution
of adequate municipal fiscal policies. Whether court-created or

legislatively inspired, the doctrine has had the same crippling effect. In
its simplest form, the doctrine stands for the proposition that if a state
109. See U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS REPORT. supra
note 98, at 84. it is reported that there is widespread opinion in California that the tax authority
language in the charters of many cities is sufficiently broad to permit the levying of a municipal
income tax, though due to public disfavor cities have been reluctant to adopt the tax.'See R.
SIGAFOOS. supra note 5,at 9. San Francisco recently enacted an "earnings tax" on non-residents
working in San Francisco city and county which was to become effective on January I, 1969.
The tax was levied on the gross receipts or compensation of each individual (with an exemption
for persons whose annual income did not exceed $4,000). The tax was to be administered by an
employer withholding scheme. Legal difficulties were encountered, however, and the tax was
declared invalid. The grounds for invalidation are unknown since a published report on the case
is not available at the time of this writing. The case is likely to be appealed. County of Alameda
v. City and County of San Francisco (Sonoma County Superior Ct., Nov. 7, 1968). It has long
been evident that cities are not always successful in implying the power to tax from their home
rule powers. Prior to receiving specific legislative authorization to levy such a tax, St. Louis
attempted to tax income on the basis of the home rule theory. This attempt was ruled invalid in
Carter Carburetor Corp. v. St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d 438 (1947).
110. T. COOLEY. TAXATION § 125 (4th ed. 1924). See also the following ruling by the
Attorney General of Alaska, denying municipalities the power to levy gasoline taxes: "Where
there is doubt as to whether or not a municipality has been granted a power which it claims,
such doubt is to be resolved against the use of such power by the municipality." U.S. ADVISORY
COIMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS REPORT.

supra note 98, at 81.
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has imposed a tax in a particular field, the state taxing authority has
presumably pre-empted that field so as to preclude local taxation in the
same area. This presumption is made even though the state tax statute
is silent as to the power of municipalities to tax in the same field. A
logical construct of the pre-emption doctrine may be made in the
following manner. Proceeding from the assumption that municipalities
are merely creatures of the state and possess no intrinsic powers of their
own, the conclusion that the state is all powerful in relation to local
government may be reached. From this conclusion, it can easily be
inferred that if the state taxes a particular area, the intention of the
state is to occupy that area exclusively and without competition from
its subordinate political units. 1 '
The pre-emption doctrine is usually applied to curtail various
types of municipal taxes, particularly non-property taxes such as the
income tax. In relation to municipal income taxation, the doctrine
simply means that where a state has levied an income tax of its own,
this levy will be deemed to have ousted municipalities entirely from the
field of income taxation."' At this point, an analysis of the case law
will be undertaken to order to demonstrate three basic forms in which
the pre-emption doctrine often appears.
(a) State interdiction.-Interdictorypre-emption, a purely
legislative creation, is simply an express incorporation of the preemption doctrine into statutory form. An excellent example of this
form of pre-emption is the Pennsylvania codification of the famous
Sterling Act of 1932"1 and Act No. 481 in 1947."1 While authorizing
municipal income taxation on the one hand, these statutes also
contained the limited language of the pre-emption doctrine by
prohibiting municipalities from taxing anything which was then, or
might in the future become, subject to state taxation. Another
illustration of express statutory pre-emption is found in Virginia. As
has already been noted,"' the Virginia legislature found that the state
I11. See Ohio Finance Co. v. City of Toledo, 163 Ohio St. 81, 125 N.E.2d 731 (1955).
This case provides a prime example of the type of reasoning outlined in the text.
112. Excellent and somewhat divergent discussions of the pre-emption doctrine in relation
to the municipal income tax can be found in the following law review articles: Glander, Analysis
and Critique of State Pre-emption of Municipal Excise and Income Taxes Under Ohio Homte
Rule, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 343 (1960); Hartman, Municipal Incomne Taxation, 31 RocKY MT. L.

-REV. 123 (1959); Glander & Dewey, Municipal Taxation: A Study of the Pre-emption Doctrine,
9 OHIO ST. L.J. 72 (1948); Fordham & Mallison, Local Income Taxation, I I OHIO ST. L.J. 217

(1950).
113.
114.
115.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15971 (Supp. 1969).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,§ 6851 (1957) (repealed 1961). See note 9 supra.
See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
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constitution gave the power to tax incomes to the state and used preemptive reasoning to expressly preclude municipal taxation of income.
(b) Statutory pre-emption by implication.- Statutory preemption by implication stands for the proposition that if a state enacts
a taxing statute, pre-emption of the field of taxation by the state, to
the exclusion of the municipalities, will be implied. The distinction
between pre-emption by implication and interdictory pre-emption
should be noted. In the latter type, there is an express prohibition of a
municipal exercise of taxing power. In the former, the prohibition is
simply implied from the existence of a similar state taxing statute, even
though the statute does not expressly preclude municipal participation
in the field.
Although the roots of this doctrine lie in the traditional
proposition that the city is a mere creature of the state, the birth of
statutory pre-emption by implication in its present form can be traced
to judicial resoning in the case of State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel."'
This ambivalent case contained language supporting a broad use of
taxing power by municipalities and formulating the doctrine of preemption by statutory implication. Over an objection that the State had
pre-empted the field of occupational taxation, the court concluded that
under the broad home rule grant," 7 the City of Cincinnati could levy
an occupational tax on all persons deriving income from businesses,
trades, vocations, or professions in the city. The court first held that
the city had the power to enter any area of taxation providing that the
State had not invaded or pre-empted the particular area by passing a
1 8
law limiting municipal power in the areaY.
The court, however, went
beyond a mere approval of the doctrine of express interdictory preemption by statute and explained the type of law which could liMfit the
municipal taxing power. The court indicated that municipal taxing
power co\ld be restricted by implication whenever a state legislative
enactment pertaining to a new area of taxation could result in
competition with cities for revenue. The court held that it was no longer
necessary for the State to pass a "thou shalt not" statute in order to
accomplish pre-emption, since the mere entrance by the State into the
116.

99OhioSt. 220, 124 N.E. 134(1919).
See OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
118. See id. § 13: "Laws may be passed to limit the power of municipalities to levy taxes
and incur debts for local purposes." The holding of the cqurt is directly in line with this provision
of the home rule amendment at this point in its chain of reasoning.
117.
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field "on its own account" was itself enough to work a pre-emption., 9
The doctrine was reinforced in Firestone v. City of Cambridge,""
where the court struck down a city excise tax on the privilege of
operating automobiles on city streets because the state had imposed a
similar tax. The court reasoned that section 13 of the Ohio home rule
amendment allowed the legislature to limit city taxing power either
expressly or by implication. The necessary implication could be made
because the legislature had pre-empted the field of excise taxation by
imposing a state levy on owners of motor vehicles. After Firestone, the
doctrine of statutory pre-emption by implication became fully accepted
in Ohio case law and has remained in force to the present. This
doctrine will most probably be subject to increasing litigation in other
states as the attractiveness of municipal income taxation increases.
Case law in Ohio applying the doctrine diverges as to the nature
of the state statute which will result in pre-emption. Ohio Finance Co.
v. City of Toledo1 2 represents an extreme view in favor of pre-emption.
In that case, the court invalidated a city income tax imposing a tax
on the net income which a dealer in intangibles derived from the
income yield. of interest-bearing promissory notes. The dealer was also
subject to a state five mill property tax on income yield from the shares
of intangibles which he owned. The state tax contained a provision to
the effect that the state tax should be "in lieu of all other taxes on
property such as intangibles owned by such a dealer." The majority
of the court concluded that the "in lieu of" provision not only applied
to prevent the levy of other state taxes, but also clearly implied a
legislative intent that a municipality could not impose a tax on income
produced by the dealer's intangible property. Therefore, in this rather
extreme holding, the court held that a state property tax could preempt a municipal income tax.
In a strong dissent, Judge Zimmerman posed the theory that has
blossomed into the concept of pre-emption espoused by the more
moderate view. The core of the dissent is succinctly set out as follows:
119.

It is interesting to note that Zielonka also contained restrictive dictum regarding the

municipal income tax. The court stated that "it is clearly to be implied from the Constitution
that municipalities are without power to levy an income or inheritance tax. . . . [T]he state alone
can initiate taxation of this character." 99 Ohio St. at 228, 124 N.E. at 136. This dictum was
later disregarded in the cases of Angell v. City of Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950),
and Stoekwell v. City of Columbus, 86 N.E.2d 822 (C.P. Franklin Cty., Ohio 1949).
120. 113 Ohio St. 57, 148 N.E. 470 (1925).
121. 163 Ohio St. 81, 125 N.E.2d 731 (1955).
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[fin order to say that the state has pre-empted a field of taxation to the exclusion
of a municipality the situation should be confined to those instances where both
the state and the municipality have imposed the same or similar tax on the same
taxpayer.'P

Judge Zimmerman's position appears to have provided the impetus for
a decision upholding a municipal income tax levy in Benua v. City of
Columbus.' 3 Against an objection that the municipal income tax was
unconstitutional as applied to rents received by a non-resident from
real property, since a tax upon such income was in essence a tax upon
the property itself and the state exclusively occupied the field of
taxation of property owned by non-residents, the court found no preemption. In rejecting the pre-emption argument, the court held that
where a municipal income tax is levied on rentals from realty, the tax
is not levied on the property from which the income is derived.
Consequently, there is no invasion of an area of taxation occupied by
the state, and the doctrine of pre-emption is without application.
It is interesting to note that the Benua court attested to the
ambivalence of the Zielonka case by citing it for the proposition that
the power of a city to adopt a tax exists so long as the state has not
pre-empted the field by enacting a state tax on the same area. Simply
stated, the Benua court found that the state tax was too dissimilar to
the local tax to pre-empt it. Despite the holding in Benua, the extent
of protection afforded to local income taxation by this similarity test
is dubious. Courts have often given effect to the pre-emption doctrine
although the facts of a case present only attenuated similarities between
the state and local taxes. 4 Recent cases seem to indicate that the
moderate view formulated by Judge Zimmerman is tentatively
followed, but that it is possible for courts to seize upon remote
similarities to find pre-emption. For example, in the recent case of East
Ohio Gas Co. v. City of Akron,12 statutory pre-emption by implication
was applied to invalidate a municipal income tax levy. The court found
that the local tax, being a tax on net income of public utilities, was
similar to a state levy on the adjusted gross income of public utilities.
Thus, the former tax was pre-empted by the latter.
(c) Constitutionalpre-emption by implication.-Another aspect
of pre-emption is the doctrine of constitutional pre-emption by
122. Id. at 89, 125 N.E.2d at 735 (emphasis added).
123. 170 Ohio St. 64, 162 N.E.2d 467 (1959).
124. See. e.g., notes 132-38 infra; Haefner v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58, 68
N.E.2d 64 (1946); Youngstown Municipal Ry. v. City of Youngstown, 154 Ohio St. 311, 95
N.E.2d 585 (1950); Murray v. City of Philadelphia, 364 Pa. 157, 71 A.2d 280 (1950).
125. 7 Ohio St. 2d 73, 218 N.E.2d 608 (1966).

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 22

implication. This doctrine reached mature formulation in the Colorado
case of City and County of Denver v. Sweet. 126 The court struck down
an attempt by Denver to levy a municipal income tax under the broad
powers granted the city in its home rule charter. In support of its
decision, the court held that a "tax-sharing" amendment to the
Colorado constitution,' 27 providing that the state legislature could levy
an income tax for the support of the state and/or any other political
subdivision thereof, gave to the state exclusive authority to impose an
income tax. Conceding that Denver may once have had the power to
levy a tax under its home rule charter, the court concluded that it does
not presently have the power because the state had pre-empted the field.
Therefore, the court found pre-emption even though the legislature had
passed no income tax legislation designed to benefit cities, and the
"tax-sharing" amendment in no way expressly prohibited municipal
income taxation.
The decision of the Sweet court appears firmly established in
Colorado law since Denver's attempts to levy a one and four-tenths of
one percent earnings tax on residents and non-residents was struck
down in a- recent case presenting essentially the same issues." In this
case, the court simply referred to the stare decisis effect of the Sweet
decision.
Although there is precedent in favor of constitutional pre-emption
by implication, some cases oppose such an approach. In rejecting the
dictum of Zielonka, Angell v. City oj Toledo 21 held that a tax-sharing
clause in the Ohio constitution in no way provided sufficient grounds
for a finding of state pre-emption. Rather, in upholding the validity of
Toledo's municipal income tax levy, the Angell court found that:
[I]n the absence of legislation by the General Assembly providing for a uniform
or graduated income tax and the required apportionment thereof and subject to
• . . [the constitutional provision] limiting the power of taxation, Ohio
municipalities have power to levy and collect an income tax.'"

By its holding, the Angell court strengthened language in Stockwell v.
City of Columbus,':' which expressly repudiated the dictum of
Zielonka and upheld the Columbus City income tax.
126. 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958).
127. COLO. CONST. art. X, 17.
128. Duffy Moving & Storage Co. v. City and County of Denver, 450 P.2d 339 (Colo.
1969).
129. 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950).
130. Id. at 183, 91 N.E.2d at 252.
131. 39 Ohio Op. 499 (C.P., Franklin Co. 1949).
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Thus, it appears impossible to determine the vitality of the
constitutional pre-emption by implication doctrine. It is perhaps more
applicable, although not necessarily so, in states whose constitutions
contain a tax-sharing clause. Cases applying the doctrine are more
recent than cases rejecting it; however, the paucity of cases in the area
prevents a definitive determination of the prevailing trend.
2. Situations in Which Municipal Income Tax Ordinances Might
Run AJul of Pre-eniption.-(a) Ordinances similar to state taxing
acts.- The dissent in Ohio Finance Co., indicating that a municipal
taxing ordinance which is the "same or similar" to a state act is
subject to pre-emption, appears to have established a trend in the area
of statutory pre-emption by implication.13 2 The test of similarity,
however, appears to be of limited utility. Consistency in the case law
is apparent only in the situation when the state and city use similar
schemes for measuring tax liability. In Ha'fner v. City of
Youngstown,'3 3 the court declared Youngstown's income tax levy on
public utilities to be invalid since both city and state used the utility
receipts as the measure of tax liability. Similarly, in Youngstown
Municipal Ry. v. City of Youngstown, 34 a city excise tax was declared
invalid and pre-empted. The city tax was measured by gross revenue
that was too closely similar to the gross income measure employed by
a state excise.
Looking beyond the measurement of tax liability, the similarity
test does not offer a reliable guide in determining whether pre-emption
will be applied. For example, in East Ohio Gas Co. v. City oJ'Akron,'31
the levy of both state and local taxes on the same taxpayer contributed
to a finding of pre-emption. In HaeJ'ner v. City of Youngstown,"'6
however, pre-emption was found even though the taxpayers were
different. The state tax in HaeJher was a gross receipts tax on public
utilities designed to tax the privilege of doing business; the city tax was
a tax levied on the consumer of the electric service. Likewise, in
Murray v. City of Philadelphia,'37 pre-emption was upheld when
different taxpayers were involved. State franchise, excise, and capital
132. See notes 121-24supraand accompanying text.
133. 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 64 (1946).
134. 154 Ohio St. 311, 95 N.E.2d 585 (1950).
135. 7 Ohio St. 2d 73, 218 N.E. 2d 608 (1966).
136. 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 65 (1946). See also note 124 supra and accompanying

text.
137.

364 Pa. 157, 71 A.2d 280 (1950).
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stock taxes levied directly on a corporation were held to pre-empt a
municipal tax on income received by individual corporate shareholders.
As the above cases indicate, the fact that a taxpayer is liable under both
the state tax and the city ordinance is not determinative of the
applicability of the pre-emption doctrine.
Although a logical application of the similarity test would prevent
pre-emption of city taxes on different subject matter than the state tax,
this has not been the case. In the Haefner and Murray cases, municipal
taxation (in the latter case, municipal income taxation) has been
invalidated by pre-emption even though the state tax was levied on an
entirely different subject.138 In light of this discussion, it is difficult to
detect any firm guideline concerning the effect of similarity on the
doctrine of'pre-emption. Significantly, an analysis of these cases reveals
that the presence of similarity has been employed in a negative sense
to support findings of pre-emption. On the other hand, the lack of
similarity has not proven a meaningful barrier to a finding of preemption. In reality, the lack of similarity between state and local taxing
acts, as a reason for refusing to apply the pre-emption doctrine, has
been utilized only in Benua. Therefore, when the similarity test is not
ignored completely, it has proven to be a bulwark of state pre-emption.
(b) The double taxation justification Jbr pre-emption by
iniplication.-The statement that "double taxation is a policy
consideration and not a legal consideration ' '3 ' is undoubtedly correct.
Courts have long sought to avoid the double taxation situation on
policy grounds. Double taxation has been defined as "the levy of the
same tax by more than one unit of government having jurisdiction over
the taxpayer. . . ."'l In the area of municipal income taxation, this
concern with adhering to the policy against double taxation has often
led to the justification of state pre-emption of a municipality's power
to tax incomes. For example, in Murray v. City of Philadelphia,"'the
court pre-empted a municipal levy on income received by corporations
since such corporations were already subject to state franchise, excise,
and capital stock taxes. That court reasoned that the allowance of a
municipal income tax on the net profits of these organizations would
138. For example, in Haefiter, the city taxed the consumer for the utility
service he received,
and the state taxed the utility corporation for the privilege of doing business. For an excellent
discussion of these similarity factors, see Hartman, supra note 112, at 142.
139. Glander, Analysis and Critique of State Pre-emption oJ'MunicipalExcise and Inconte
Taxes Under Ohio Home Rule, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 343, 358 (1960).
140. Id.at 361.
141. 364 Pa. 157,71 A.2d 280 (1950).
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be a double tax and would -result in such corporations bearing a heavier
economic burden than those not subject to the municipal tax.
Consequently, the economic burden would be duplicated.
A similar rationale for pre-emption was advanced in East Ohio
Gas Co. v. City of Akron."2 Akron was imposing a tax on the net
income of a public utility, whose adjusted gross income was also
subject to state taxation. As one basis for decision, the court concluded
that statutory pre-emption by implication applies to prevent double
taxation of the utility. Thus the city tax was invalidated although no
statutory or constitutional provision expressly denied the city the right
to levy such a tax.
Cities considering enacting a municipal income tax ordinance,
therefore, would do well to consider the possible invalidating effects of
the policy against double taxation. Such cities might argue that,
regardless of well-meaning jurists and tax scholars who support the
policy against double taxation, state-federal taxation of the individual
demonstrates a most flagrant example of double taxation. Since
sources of revenue cannot be separated at the state-federal level, they
should not be separated at the state-local level.
(c) The eJftct of tax-sharing schenies.-Although the possible
effect of statutory or constitutional tax-sharing clauses has' previously
been discussed,"' the existence of such a clause can be a serious pitfall
for cities desiring to enact a municipal income tax. Tax-sharing clauses
have often been construed by courts as a statutory or constitutional
implication that this field of taxation has been pre-empted by the state.
3. The Kentucky Guise.-Largely by judicial fiat and statutory
construction of the most technical kind, cities in Kentucky have
managed to avoid the pre-emption pitfall even though the state
legislature has enacted a state income tax. Kentucky cities, with the
approval of Kentucky courts, have avoided pre-emption problems by
resorting to a characterization of municipal taxes measured by gross
income as "occupational license taxes." Legal writers have duly noted
that this tax is actually a form of municipal income tax which was
expressly recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Howard
v. Conmmissioner of the Sinking Fund of Louisville.tu Construing the
famous Buck Act, the Court found that the Act gave state and local
governments the power to tax incomes of federal employees working
142.
143.
144.

7 Ohio St. 2d 73, 218 N.E.2d 608 (1966).
See notes 127-31 supra and accompanying text.
249 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1952), aqJ'd,344 U.S. 624 (1953).
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within their boundaries. The Court further held that the Louisville
Occupational License Tax was an inconie tax within the meaning of
the Buck Act, which defined an income tax as any tax levied on or
measured by net income, gross income, or gross receipts.
Contrary to the holding in Howard, many Kentucky cases have
held' that the occupational license tax is distinguishable from a true
income tax, although the measure, rate, and base are identical in form
to those of a true income tax. In the recent case of Batten v.
Hambley,"16 a Kentucky court held that the withholding provision of
the occupational license tax does not make it synonomous with an
income tax.
Since individual income in Kentucky is taxed by both the cities
and the state, the policy against double taxation is contravened.
Kentucky cities have managed to avoid having these levies invalidated
because State courts do not recognize the validity of that policy. As
one commentator has indicated:
Kentucky courts have

. . .

taken the position that property or ownership is made

up of a bundle of the varied and many privileges afforded by the local government,
as well as by the state government. Those various privileges are proper subjects
.of taxation and they can be taxed collectively.1"

Whether courts in other states would follow this reasoning
concerning double taxation is unclear. Apparently, a similar
characterization of an income tax as an occupational license tax met
with success in only one other state." 8 Though the Kentucky approach
may prove of limited use to cities in other states, such cities should
at least consider the utility of attempting to avoid pre-emption
problems by characterizing an income tax as an occupational license
tax.149
4. The Utility and Validity of the Pre-emption
Doctrine.-(a) Is there a logical basis for pre-emption?- lt is
145. See. e.g., Kupper v. Fiscal Court, 346 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1961); Sims v. Board of
Education, 290 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1956). City of Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W.2d
248 (1948).
146. 400 S.W.2d 683 (Ky. 1966).
147. Hartman, supra note 112, at 143.
148. See Estes v.City of Gadsden, 266 Ala. 166, 94 So. 2d 744 (1957).
149. This might be a worthwhile approach for Denver. In City & County of Denver v. Durfy
Storage & Moving Co., 450 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1969), which struck down an "earnings" tax, the
court cited the Sebree case from Kentucky as authority for sustaining a "Business Occupational
Privilege Tax" that levied a flat $2 per month fee on every person employed in Denver making
over $250 per month. This tax is not itself an income tax since it is not measured by income,
The fiscal situation in Denver and the citing of Sebree as authority by the court, however, might
make an attempt to enact a Kentucky-style occupational license tax worthwhile.
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generally conceded that the state, by means of an express interdiction
in the form of a "thou shalt not" statute, may effectively pre-empt
local power to levy income taxes. The controversy surrounding the preemption doctrine arises from the closely related concepts of statutory
pre-emption by implication and constitutional pre-emption by
implication. These concepts present the issue of whether a pre-emption
can be reasonably implied when a legislature levies a particular tax or
a constitution grants to the state the power to levy a tax, both in the
absence of an express prohibition of municipal taxation.
Approaching the statutory issue, it appears that logic simply will
not support the implication of pre-emption. As one commentator
points out, the illogicality of this implication is particularly apparent
in states such as Ohio where cities operate under a home rule
amendment, deriving their power to tax directly from the
constitution.' In this situation, the Angell case accentuates the effect
of a home rule grant in diminishing the state's sphere of power while
concomitantly broadening the municipal sphere of power, including the
power to tax. 51' Therefore, the state has no base of power from which
to infer a pre-emption and preclusion of a home rule city tax. Instead,
the state can limit municipal taxing power only by an express
prohibition as is allowed in the home rule amendment.'5 2 Despite the
appealing logic of Angell, the cases discussed in preceding sections
indicate that pre-emption by implication is still a viable concept in
Ohio.
Though the strongest argument for voiding the statutory preemption by implication concept can be made in states which have home
rule cities, analogous reasoning appears applicable to uphold levies
where -home rule is not a factor. Assuming the state has power of
express prohibitory interdiction, and in the absence of an express
constitutional prohibition, there would seem to be little logic in implied
pre-emption. This conclusion is reasonable because a legislature may
expressly prohibit local levy by statute if it intends to pre-empt an area
of taxation.
In a similar vein, the concept of constitutional pre-emption by
implication is also lacking in logical support. As the Sweet case made
150. Glander, supra note 139, at 359.
151. Glander underscores the unreasonableness of pre-emption by implication by indicating
that no provisions of the Ohio constitution and no decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio (save
one which is quite old) would prevent state and local government from simultaneous occupancy
of a field of taxation in the absence of an express legislative prohibition. Id. at 360.
152. See OHIO CoNsr. art. XVIII. § 13.
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apparent, a constitutional grant to a state of the power to levy an
income tax may pre-empt a similar city levy, even though the state has
not exercised its power.153 In view of the lack of constitutional
prohibition granted to it, there are equally strong, if not stronger,
grounds to support an implication that no pre-emption was intended.
Even if the state had exercised the constitutional grant of power and
levied an income tax, in the absence of express constitutional or
statutory prohibition, there is no logically compelling reason why this
circumstance demands a finding of pre-emption by implication.
In relation to constitutional and statutory pre-emption by
implication, one commentator in the field has expressed his distaste for
the two concepts as follows:
On what basis can it realistically be contended that the state taxing statute [or

the constitutional authorization for such a state statute] encompasses more than
the primary objective of financing state business? On what basis can . . . it
realistically . . . be said that the state taxing statute [or the constitutional
authorization for such a state statute] constitutes a linitation on municipal or
other local taxation? What intrinsic or extrinsic aid to statutory [or constitutional]
interpretation compels, or even justifies, such a secondary purpose of a limitation,
when the taxing statute or constitution, as the case may be, is completely' silent
regarding any such preclusion of municipal taxation? Raising state revenue is one
thing, but limiting municipal taxation is a horse of an entirely different color."

(b) Does
Dillon's Rule support pre-emption by
iniplication?-Since Dillon's Rule and the Pre-emption Doctrine both
proceed from the same assumption about state-local relationships, the
former might possibly offer some support for the latter. Both concepts
are based on the general legal proposition that the city is a creature of
the state and is capable of exercising only those powers given it by the
state. Proceeding from this proposition, the first component of Dillon's
Rule, along with pre-emption by implication (either statutory or
constitutional), seems to stand for the proposition that the city cannot
exercise power without an express grant of power from the state. The
only difference lies in the manner in which the proposition is expressed.
The first component of Dillon's Rule affirmatively states that express
language is necessary to grant power, taxing or otherwise, to a
municipality. On the other hand, the doctrine of pre-emption by
implication expresses the same idea in a negative manner. The lack of
express language giving power to a municipality, coupled with the
existence of a similar state power may be grounds for the implication
153. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
154. Hartman, supra note 112, at 147. For a similar discussion, see Fordham & Mallison,
Local Income Taxation, I I OHIo ST. L.J. 217 (1950).
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that the municipality has no authority. 5 5 Therefore, the first
component of Dillon's Rule is consistent with and lends support to the
doctrine of pre-emption by implication.
The first component of Dillon's Rule, however, cannot be read in
isolation from the other two branches. It is submitted that in states
where Dillon's Rule ig accepted,'56 the second and third components
offer cities a possible avenue of escape from pre-emption by
implication. This conclusion is based on the belief that the doctrine, of
pre-emption by implication is inconsistent with Dillon's Rule when
read in its entirety. The finding of pre-emption by implication appears
to ignore the meaning of the second and third components of Dillon's
Rule. The second component of the Rule indicates that a city can
exercise those powers which can be necessarily or fairly implied from,
or are incident to, powers expressly granted. With regard to home rule
5
cities having broad express'grants of general governmental power,' it
seems likely that a taxing power could be fairly implied from or
considered incidental to these sweeping but express grants of home rule
power. Indeed, this idea has been tacitly given effect in at least one case
involving a home rule city's levy of an income tax. In Dooley v. City
of Detroit,58 the Michigan court upheld thetax, over a pre-emption by
implication objection, on the ground that under the constitution and
Home Rule Cities Act 59 cities could exercise substantially greater
powers than they had previously exercised. Although these new powers
were not plenary and their exercise must be justified as essential to local
government, the exercise of a. power similar -to the imposition of a
municipal income tax wis so fundamental that it.could be undertaken
without express authorization from the state.
The third component of Dillon's Rule also offers a method to
evade pre-emption by implication. The third component indicates that
a municipal corporation may exercise those powers absolutely essential
to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation. The raising of
revenue is certainly essential to the declared objects of government, for
155. Compare State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919), with
City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 329 P.2d 441 (Colo. 1958), and note 105 supra and

accompanying text.
156.

It would appear ihat acceptance of the Rule is widespread. See U.S. ADVISORY
supra note 98, at 81 n.9.
See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
370 Mich. 194, .121 N.W.2d 724 (1963). Contra, Carter Carburetor Corp. v. City of
356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d 438 (1947).
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.2082(I) (1949).

COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS REPORT,

157.
158.
St. Louis,

159.
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without adequate revenue those objects cannot be attained. There are
numerous cases holding that a fundamental power of city government
is the power to raise revenue.' Therefore, a persuasive argument can
be made on the basis of the second and/or third components of
Dillon's Rule for avoiding pre-emption by implication and sustaining
city power to tax incomes. In contradistinction to supporting preemption by implication, Dillon's Rule may provide cities with an
unexpected key to the avoidance of that restrictive doctrine.
(c) Final criticisms ofpre-emption.-ln the context of the fiscal
needs of today's cities, pre-emption, particularly pre-emption by
implication, is absurd. The tumultuous events of the past several years
in our nation's cities can probably be attributed in large part to the
inability of the city to raise revenue sufficient to support the services
essential to efficient government. In continuing to apply pre-emption
by implication, the judiciary is exhibiting a totally unrealistic attitude
toward the fiscal needs of the city. They continue to prevent cities from
reaching a sorely needed source of revenue even though the state levy
is nominal or, as in the Sweet case, non-existent.
It seems clear that the pre-emption impediment should be removed
and cities should be allowed to tax incomes. This could be
accomplished in one of three ways: first, judicial decisions based on
Dillon's Rule or some similar argument might be employed to defeat
pre-emption by implication; secondly, interdictory pre-emption and
statutory pre-emption by implication could be quickly disposed of by
the simple expedient of permissive legislation, which expressly
repudiates pre-emption and clears the path to local taxation; lastly,
where constitutional pre-emption by implication is involved,
constitutional amendment might be possible to remove the
impediment.'
C.

Unijbrmnity Problems- Due Processand Equal Protection

1. Classification Problems.-(a) Distinctions between residents
and non-residents. From the early days of its existence, municipal
income taxation has been subjected to constitutional challenge on the
ground that the taxation of non-residents amounts to a taking of
property without due process of law. One of the first cases to consider
160. See, e.g., Angell v. City of Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E. 2d 250 (1950).
161. Furthermore, the state legislature might possibly circumvent constitutional preemption by exercising its powers over taxation in such a way as to create special exceptions to
the constitutional clause. See Hartman, supra note 112, at 145-46.
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the problem of the taxation of non-residents was Kiker v. City of
6 2
Philadelphia.
The court upheld the tax as applied to a non-resident
federal employee, a citizen of New Jersey, working at a -federal
installation in Philadelphia. The court reasoned that since the nonresident worked in Philadelphia, he received the benefits and protection
of the city during his ivorlking hours. These benefits and protections
were held to justify the taxation of his income because the city had a
right to expect the non-resident to render some payment in return for
the services it provided. Thus, the tax was not held to constitute a
deprivation of property without due process of law since the taxpayer
received tangible benefits in return.13 In the more recent Missouri case
of Arnold v. Berra,'" ' the St. Louis income tax was upheld on similar
reasoning, over the objection of an Illinois resident that he was being
deprived of property without due process of law, and that such a tax
placed an undue burden on interstate commerce.
In a closely related group of cases, courts have considered due
process challenges to the municipal income tax liability of persons who
are residents of the taxing city but earn all or part of their income
outside of the city. Once again, the courts have upheld the tax on the
ground that the taxpayer receives tangible benefits, protection, services,
and opportunities from the city of his residence. Consequently, the
taxpayer should contribute to the city's support by paying the income
tax, even though his income may have been earned elsewhere.6 5
Thus, both a non-resident earning income in the taxing city, and
a resident earning income ou-tside the city may be taxed without
constitutional problems on the' theory that each receives benefits from
the taxing city for which he should pay.
(b) Distinctions between earned and unearned income.-As to
the taxation of earned and unearned income, the cases demonstrate that
unearned income, such as rents and dividends, may be subject to
taxation in the same manner as earned income. Taxation of rental
income has been upheld because the city provides protection for the
realty from which the rental income is derived. 66 Again, due process
162. 346 Pa. 624, 31 A.2d 289 (1943).
163. The court found that among the most tangible benefits the non-resident received was
the clearing of ice from the river during the winter which allowed the New Jersey resident to
commute to his job.
164. 366 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1963).
165. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Yeskey, 409 Pa. 12, 185 A.2d 516 (1962); City of Springfield
y. Kennedy, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 123, 104 N.E.2d 65 (Ct. App. Clark County, 1951).
166. See. e.g., Benua v. City of Columbus, 170 Ohio St. 64, 162 N.E.2d 467 (1959).

1350

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 22

is not violated because a benefit is received for which the taxpayer
should pay.
On the other hand, some cities have distinguished the tax liability
on earned from unearned income, exempting the latter while taxing the
former. Against challenges that such a classification denied equal
protection of the law to those who were taxed on earned income by
unfairly discriminating in favor of those who received unearned
income, the courts have held a classification of this type valid and not
a denial of equal protection. For example, in Barhorsty. City of St.
Louis,6' the court held that enabling legislation authorizing charter
cities to levy an earnings tax on salaries, wages, commissions, and
other earned compensation without including unearned income such as
rents, dividends, and interest, is not so unreasonable and arbitrary with
respect to classification as to violate due process and equal protection.
The court employed the policy against double taxation to support its
conclusion reasoning that such unearned income is derived primarily
from property already subject to city property taxes. Therefore, the
exemption of such unearned income from the income tax avoids double
taxation and is not an unconstitutional classification.
Thus, unearned income can either be taxed in addition to earned
income or exempted. Considerations of due process or equal protection
do not pose serious barriers in either case.
(c)

Distinctions between corporate and individual tax

liability.-A study of the cases in this area reveals a certain amount
of inconsistency in the holdings. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.

City of Youngstown,' 6 8 the City corporate income tax was held
unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection since corporate net
profits were taxed at a one percent rate, while individuals and
unincorporated businesses were taxed at a rate of three-tenths of one
percent. The court determined that the City had failed to demonstrate
a reasonable basis for taxing corporations at a higher non-uniform
rate, and thus equal protection was denied.
An ample demonstration that the quest for uniformity is not the
controlling factor is provided by cases holding that a city tax is not
an unconstitutional discrimination where residents were taxed on their
entire income, but corporations were taxed only on income earned in
the city." 9 Likewise, equal protection has not been denied to businesses
167.
168.

423 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. 1968).
91 Ohio App. 431, 108 N.E.2d 571 (1951).

169. See, e.g., Barhorst v. City of St. Louis, 423 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. 1968); City of
Springfield v. Krichbaum, 88 Ohio App. 239, 100 N.E.2d 281 (1950).
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subject to the levy, where certain corporations such as insurance
companies and express companies have been excluded from income tax
liability because of the difficulty in measuring their net profits. 70
Apparently, the rationale of these cases is gleaned from the
determination of whether a city can demonstrate a justifiable reason for
discrimination. If this is done, the discrimination will be upheld on the
policy against double taxation or on a consideration of administrative
feasibility. If a justifiable reason is not demonstrated, as in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube, the discrimination will be held to deny
equal protection.
(d) Distinctions in the tax liability of wage earners and those
deriving income from businesses or professions.-The cases dealt with
in this section involve the question of whether municipal ordinances,
which impose a tax on wages and salaries on the one hand, and net
profits derived from businesses and professions on the other, are
unconstitutional because of the distinction made between wage earners
and those engaged in businesses or professions. One of the first cases
to consider this issue was Dole v. City of Philadelphia,7 ' in which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a city income tax differentiating
between wages and net profits did not contravene constitutional
requirements of uniform taxation. The court reasoned that because the
tax burden fell equally on all wage earners as a class, and all business
owners and professional persons as a class, the constitutionally
72
imposed conditions of uniformity had been met.
In Walters v. City of St. Louis'7 3 the United States Supreme Court
upheld the St. Louis municipal income tax against a charge that it was
discriminatory as between salaries and net profits and violated due
process and equal protection. The Court stated that equal protection
requires only that the statutory classification be based on actual
differences, that the differentiation have some relevance to the purpose
for which the classification was made, and that the different treatments
"be not so disparate, relative to the difference in classification as to
be wholly arbitrary."
As in other areas of classification, it appears that classifications
which differentiate between the income earned by wage earners and that
170. See Barhorst v. City of St. Louis, 423 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. 1968).
171. 337 Pa. 375, II A.2d 163 (1940).
172. As additional support for the reasonableness of the classification, the court noted that
the expected yields in wage income were more predictable and less speculative than the income
derived from business and professional enterprise.
173. 259 S.W.2d 377 (Mo. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 231 (1954).
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earned from business enterprises or professional activities will be
allowed where the city can demonstrate a reasonable basis for such
discrimination.
(e)

Miscellaneous distinctions.- It should be noted that

municipal income tax ordinances which exempt residents who are
members of the armed forces from income taxation are not
unconstitutional for lack of uniformity. In this situation, the
differentiation has been upheld as reasonable on the ground that
serving in the armed forces was a sacrifice which entitled servicemen
to such an exemption.17 Also, municipal income tax which taxed the
gross income of individuals but only the net income of businesses was
7
held to be constitutional since the differentiation was reasonableY.
5
2.

Some Conclusions on Uniformity.-A study of the relevant

cases indicates a fairly consistent pattern in the decisional process
which can be used to rationalize the results in most, if not all, of the
cases. First, where an income taxing ordinance is challenged on equal
protection grounds, decisions similar to Walters and Farrell
demonstrate that the ordinance will survive the constitutional test if the
city can show that the differentiations made by the ordinance were
based on reasonable grounds, such as considerations of essential
fairness or administrative feasibility. On the other hand, if the
ordinance contains unreasonable classifications, as in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube, it will not withstand constitutional attack.
Secondly, where an income taxing ordinance is challenged on the
ground that property is taken without due process of law, the ordinance
will be upheld if the city can show that it is giving the taxpayer a
sufficient consideration, as in Kiker, in return for extracting the tax
payment. Where the city cannot show a benefit from it to the taxpayer,
however, the ordinance will most likely be invalidated on the due
process challenge.
D.

Problems Encountered in Extending the Scope of Municipal
Income Taxing Liability
1. Problems of Double Taxation.-Double taxation problems

can be resolved into two major areas of concern. The first area, which
was discussed extensively in connection with the previous
considerations of the pre-emption doctrine, involves a municipal levy
174. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Farrell, 205 Pa. Super. 263, 209 A.2d 867 (1965).
175. City of Springfield v. Krichbaum, 88 Ohio App. 239, 100 N.E.2d 281 (1950).
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on income subject to a state tax of a similar or different
nature.1 76 The
..I
second area, which is the subject of this section, is taxpayer liability
for income taxes imposed by more than one city. One authority has
succinctly expressed the problem as follows:
There is . . a very real danger of double taxation for those taxpayers who live
in one local taxing unit but earn all or a part of their income in another. In some
states . . .local income taxes hit the suburban resident who earns his pay or
carries on his business is a neighboring city. Often the suburbs strike back at the
taxing city by passing their own local income tax laws. The unfortunate taxpayer
7
may, therefore, be.caught in the middle by a double local income tax.'

An excellent example of an "unfortunate taxpayer" was presented
8
in Thompson v. City of Cincinnati.""
That case involved a declaratory
judgment action brought by a resident of Loveland, Ohio, who worked
in Cincinnati, to determine his liability with regpect to the payment of
municipal income taxation. Both citieshad enacted income tax
ordinances. The court held that the plaintiff was subject to the taxes
of both cities and determined, with respect to the Cincinnati tax, that
a city may levy a tax on wages derived from work performed within
its boundaries by a non-resident of that city. With regard to the
Loveland tax, the court indicated that the city of residence could levy
a tax on wages resulting from work done in another city. The court
concluded that the plaintiff could be taxed by both cities because the
burden of supplying necessary revenue to maintain municipalities must
be shared by those who are provided with substantial benefits by
municipalities. Thus, it appears that a benefit theory of taxation, which
has been used to uphold the municipal income tax against due process
contentions,'79 also supports taxation by the city of residence as well as
the city of employment.
Although double taxation was upheld in Thompson through an
application of the benefit theory, this does not necessarily represent the
general practice. For example, in Pennsylvania, statutes alleviate the
problem of double taxation. Cities of residence in Pennsylvania are
given an exclusive right to tax the income of their citizens.
Furthermore, a taxpayer is allowed to credit the tax paid to his resident
city against any income tax liability he may have incurred in other
cities.' Michigan has recently enacted a Uniform City Income Tax
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
exempted

See generally notes 13943 supra and accompanying text.
Hartman, supra note 112, at 130.
2 Ohio St. 2d 292, 208 N.E.2d 747 (1965).
See note 162 supra and accompanying text.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6914 (Supp. 1969). Philadelphia is the lone city
from the coverage of this statute. Philadelphia has been given the exclusive power to
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Ordinance which allows a person who earns income outside of his city
of residence to credit the income tax paid to the city of his employment
against the income tax liability incurred in his home city. 8' Thus,
statutory solutions to the problem of double taxation may favor the
city of residence, as in Pennsylvania, or the city of employment, as in
Michigan. In light of the reasoning of the Thompson case, however, it
appears that there is a persuasive argument that the double tax is a
justifiable means of raising revenue to support both the city of
residence and the city of employment.
2.

Problems in Taxing State and Federal Employees.-

(a) Federal employee liability.- Invariably two objections have been
made to the taxation of federal employees: first, local taxation of the
incomes of federal employees constitutes a direct, and hence
unconstitutional, burden on the federal government; and secondly, that
federal installations are not part of the taxing municipality in which
they are located.
The first objection has met with complete rejection by the courts,
which have generally held that the tax is levied on the private income
of the government employee and in no way constitutes a burden on
the federal government.8 2 With the congressional enactment of the Buck
Act and the subsequent interpretation by the United States Supreme
Court, this objection to taxation of federal employees is no longer
viable. In Howard v. Commissioner of the Sinking Fund of

Louisville,'1 the Court construed the Buck Act as a congressional grant
of consent to state and local governments to tax the income of federal
employees. Even local methods of enforcement of the tax which might
incidentally interfere with the conduct of federal activities (e.g., the
arrest of a federal employee on the job for non-payment of city income
taxes) have been held not to constitute an illegal burden.""
The second objection also has little force. The leading case in the
area, Kiker v. City of Philadelphia,""construed the Buck Act to mean
that a local government may reserve to an area ceded to the federal
government the power to tax within its geographical limits. Using the
tax incomes of non-residents earned in the city. Double taxation is no problem, however, because

other cities cannot tax the income of residents who earned wages or salaries in Philadelphia. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 6901-6914 (Supp. 1969).
181. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3194(75) (Supp. 1969).
"182.
183.
184.
185.

City of Philadelphia v. Schaller, 148 Pa. Super. 276, 25 A.2d 406 (1942).
344 U.S. 624 (1953).
Application of Thompson, 157 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
346 Pa. 624, 31 A.2d 289 (1943). See also City of Cincinnati v. Faig, 145 N.E.2d 563

(Cincinnati Mun. Ct. 1957).

1969]

NOTES

1355

"benefit theory," the court reasoned that the local government ceded
the area, but retained the obligation of furnishing protection and
benefits to persons and property within the confines of the area.
Therefore, the federal employee received the benefits of this protection
and should defray the cost to the city through tax payments. The scope
of the Kiker decision can be demonstrated in the rather novel case of
City of Springfield v. Kenney,' where the court used similar reasoning
to hold a resident of a federal housing project within the coverage of
the municipal tax. Thus, the general rule is that cities may levy income
taxes in federal installations which are within the geographic
boundaries of the city, and tax either residents or non-residents
working at such an installation. Presumably, a city may also tax the
income of a federal employee who lives in the taxing city but derives
his income from federal work outside of the city. A levy of this nature
would seem to be a valid exercise of municipal taxirig power under the
benefit theory.
(b) State employee liability.-The right of a city to tax state
employees has been upheld as against two objections: first, that the city
is without power to tax a state employee because the city is merely a
creature of the state; and secondly, that the tax imposes an illegal
burden on the state government.
The first objection was rejected in Marson v. City of
8 7 In an opinion analogous to the Supreme Court's
Philadelphia.'
Howard decision, the court found that the city tax was levied on the
private incomes of the state employees and in no way impaired the
power of the state nor subordinated it to local power. The second
objection was rejected in McConnell v. City of Columbus.'88 In that
case, the city levied an income tax on wages earned by non-residents
for services performed at a state university on property of the university
located within the city. Upholding the tax, the court reasoned that a
non-discriminatory tax on income earned from services rendered to an
instrumentality of the state government does not constitute a tax on
that government and is not an interference with or burden upon the
activities of the government. Thus, it is conclusively established that
municipalities can tax the income of federal and state employees.
186.
187.
188.

65 Ohio L. Abs. 123, 104 N.E.2d 65 (Ct. App. Clark County, 1951).
342 Pa. 369,21 A.2d 228 (1941).
172 Ohio St. 95, 173 N.E.2d 760 (1961).
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E. Administrative Problems
1. The Withholding Burden.-All jurisdictions imposing the

municipal income tax require resident employers to withhold tax
payments from the wages and salaries of employees. This requirement
is considered an absolute necessity to the successful collection and
administration of the tax. 89 As an example, Ohio cities obtained 70 to
80 percent of their total collections from employers' withholdings in
1966.190 The withholding requirements not only allow tax
administrators to consolidate many individual accounts into relatively
few accounts for employers, but they substantially decrease the
likelihood of tax evasion since the individual employee does not
compute and remit his own tax. Where employers are located outside
the taxing jurisdiction, state laws generally do not give the cities the
power to require employers to withhold tax payments for residents of
the cities. 9 '
Indicating a strong concern for the administrative feasibility of
municipal taxation, courts have allowed the cities to shift much of the
burden involved in collecting the tax to the business community by
means of mandatory withholding provisions. The decisive factor is
whether the employer is doing business within the taxing community.
No cases have been found which allow a city to force a non-resident
employer not doing business within the city to withhold wages of
residents of the city. Although it is possible that a city might convince
non-resident employers to cooperate voluntarily, jurisdictional
problems would provide a formidable obstacle.
2.

The Exemption Problem.-In the interest of decreasing

administrative costs and increasing ease of collection, courts have held
that a city exemption of persons whose annual income falls below a
minimum level is not an unconstitutional discrimination against
persons of higher income levels. 92 The apparent discrimination is
189.
(1968).

Conlon, Enforcement of the Municipal Income Tax, 28 ACAD. POL. SCI. PROC. 481

190.

Collection from withholdings as a percent of total collections in the major Ohio cities

in 1966 were: Akron 79.9%; Cincinnati 74.2%; Columbus 74.4%; Lima 76.5%; Toledo 80%; and
Youngstown 77.8%. OHIo MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, supra note 58.
191. It is also noteworthy that a city cannot impose the task of withholding provisions upon
federal and state agencies since this would be considered an illegal burden on those higher

governmental agencies. Usually, federal and state agencies will furnish employee lists with a
record of wages earned to the taxing city. This list is of some aid in checking compliance.
192. See City of Springfield v. Kennedy, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 123, 104 N.E.2d 65 (Ct. App.
Clark County, 195 1); cf. Butcher v. City of Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 497, 6 A.2d 298 (1938) (denying
certain types of exemptions).
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justified on the ground that the benefit derived by the city in terms of
being relieved of collecting the negligible sums due on small incomes
more than balances the inequity suffered by those persons in higher
income brackets who cannot take advantage of the exemption.
Also, cities do not discriminate unreasonably against resident
employers by waiving statutory interests and penalties for non-resident
employers in order to gain their voluntary cooperation and compliance
with withholding schemes.1 13 Although there are serious jurisdictional
questions as to whether such penalties could actually be imposed on
non-residents, the waiver has been allowed in light of the need to
decrease administrative costs.
3. Enforcelnent.-The third administrative problem in applying
a municipal income tax is enforcement. Most tax ordinances provide
for penalties on delinquent taxes, and many provide that delinquent
taxes shall accumulate interest at the rate of six percent per annum.194
The new New York City ordinance provides a stiff penalty of 5,000
dollars or one year's imprisonment for any person willfully evading the
tax. In a further step to facilitate compliance with the New York
ordinance, any employer who willfully fails to withhold the amount of
tax owed by employees from their wages will also be liable for a
penalty of 5,000 dollars or one year's imprisonment.' 5 New York
City's penalties are more stringent than the penalties imposed for
evasion in most cities, and it seems likely that New York's enforcement
record will be superior to that of most other cities. In the rare instances
where delinquency penalties have been administered, the penalties have
been generally light. Naturally, this leniency has contributed little to
increase compliance with the tax. Vigorous enforcement of such
penalties as exist in the New York City law, however, would
considerably reduce evasionary practices.
Evasion is most often attempted by self-assessing individual
taxpayers whose tax liability is not withheld by an employer. It is
estimated that only ten percent of this group willfully evade the tax."'
Nevertheless, the tax revenue which is incurred but not paid because
of such illegal practices in most cities would probably justify harsher
penalties of the New York type and a concomitant increase in
enforcement efforts.
193.
194.
195.

196.

City of Philadelphia v. Farrell, 205 Pa. Super. 263, 209 A.2d 867 (1965).
R. SIGAFoos, supra note 5, at 56.
N.Y. SESS. LAWS ch. 773, § 25-a(§ 75) (McKinney 1966).
R. SIGAFOOS, supra note 5, at 81-82.
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Evasion by resident businesses of municipal income taxation
presents a particularly difficult problem. Businesses have unusual
opportunities for successful evasion because the tax is levied on their
net profits. Since the net profit figure is derived from the records of
the businesses themselves, the difficulty of enforcement becomes obvious. Although an estimation of how much tax revenue is lost to cities
each year by business evasion would be imprecise, it is probably a
substantial amount. In order to prevent widespread evasion by businesses, cities would be required to conduct periodic, detailed investigations
of the profit and loss account of every resident firm, which would involve prohibitive costs for most municipalities. Thus, it is apparent
that where cities must depend upon self-assessment, either by individuals or by businesses, the problems of enforcement are greatly increased.
One factor which increases the enforcement problem is the lack of
cross-checking with income tax authorities at higher levels of
government. Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the governor

of each state may request that certain state officials, or officials of
local governments which administer tax laws, inspect tax returns for
all indiyiduals or corporations within the state. Such inspection is
limited, hovever, to the Internal Revenue offices during normal
business hours.1 7 Even though checking does occur at the state level,
there have been no reported instances in which it has been used by the
local income tax administrators. In relation to coordination of tax
administration at the state and local levels, Kentucky and New York
are the only states which specifically authorize the state tax agencies
to exchange tax information with local government. Alabama and
Missouri authorize the state official to exchange information with the
Internal Revenue Service, but no similar provisions are allowed for the
local tax administrators. 98 Missouri specifically prohibits
municipalities from exchanging tax information with the State.)9
Baltimore has no problem in this area, since its tax is administered by
the State. The Michigan cities are authorized to contract with the State
tax administration for collection of local income taxes20 0
197.
198.
199.
200.

INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6103(b)(2);Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(b)-l(a)-(d) (1961).
Conlon, supra note 189, at 483-84.
Id.
See note 20 supra.
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COMPARISON OF THE OTHER SOURCES OF LOCAL REVENUE
WITH THE INCOME TAX

A.

The Property Tax

A study of the municipal income tax is not complete without a
comparison with other local sources of tax revenue. Aside from grants
from the federal and state governments, city officials generally depend
upon the property, sales, gross receipts, and income taxes as their main
sources of revenue. The majority of tax revenues in the cities has
traditionally come from the property tax, which is generally
overburdened, regressive, and in need of administrative reform.
An examination of the percentages of local revenues obtained from
the various types of taxation illustrates the relative dependence of local
governments upon the property tax. In 1902, the property tax
accounted for 73.1 percent of all local government revenues; other taxes
contributed 20.4 percent; and state and federal grants totaled 6.5
percent. Over the years, the property tax has decreased as a percentage
of total revenues received by the cities, amounting to 73.9 percent in
1927, 60.1 percent in 1940, 50.2 percent in 1950, 48.7 percent in 1957,
and 47.9 percent in 1962. In 1962, contributions from the state and
federal governments rose to 30.3 percent, and non-property taxes
totaled 34.9 percent of total revenues.20 ' When the property tax is
compared with other local taxes, it can be noted that property taxeg
account for a much higher proportion of revenue than all other taxes
in many cities. The cities without income taxes are much more
dependent upon the property tax than those with the income tax. In
1966, Los Angeles derived 56 percent of its total tax revenues from the
property tax and 25 percent from the sales tax. Chicago received 63
percent of its revenues from the property tax and nine percent from the
sales tax. On the other hand, Philadelphia and Detroit, both of which
have the income tax, derived only 42 percent and 28 percent
0
respectively of their total revenues in 1966 from the property tax. 1
The two most prevalent criticisms of the property tax are its
inequities due to non-uniformity of assessment and its regressiveness.
Problems of non-uniformity of assessment are widespread throughout
most municipalities and arise from a number of different factors. In
201. J. BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT, THE METROPOLIS 348 (1965).
202. TAX FOUNDATION, INC., supra note 24, at 43. In 1966, for cities with populations
ranging from 1/2 to I million not including St. Louis, Pittsburg, or Cincinnati, the property tax
averaged 86% of total tax revenues. In the same year, St. Louis, which has the income tax, derived
40% of its tax revenues from the property tax, and 34% from the income tax.
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all but four states, the tax applies to both real and tangible personal
property," thus making valuation a tremendous task even if a uniform
method of valuation is used. Assessments in most communities are
2 4
usually at a fraction of the fair market value of the property. "
Assessment levels will often vary on properties with different age, use,
and location. Where the tax covers business inventory, fixtures, and
machinery, manipulation of assets by the businesses subject to the tax
often results. 05 One often noted defect is the political nature of the
position of municipal tax assessors and administrators, many of whom
may be unfamiliar with the statutes and regulations in the area at the
time of their appointment or election. 06 Another political problem
which causes wide variation in the percentage of assessed value is the
conflict between the state and local methods of assessment.
In addition to being poorly administered, property tax is regressive
since it takes a higher percentage of income from the lower income
groups than those in the higher brackets. Expenditures for housing, as
well as local taxes paid, generally absorb a smaller percentage of
income as the level of income rises. Furthermore, valuable residential
properties in many communities tend to be more under-assessed
2 7
relative to their market value than properties of low or average value.
B.

The Sales Tax

Since the turn of the century, the retail sales tax has grown to be
the largest non-property source of local revenues in many cities.Ix As
of January 1, 1968, sales taxes were in use in 44 states and the District
of Columbia. 210 Approximately 3,000 local taxing authorities in
seventeen states now levy the sales tax which generated almost one and
one-half billion dollars in revenue for local governments in 1965-66.7n 1,
203. Harriss, Economic Evaluation of Real Property Taxes. 28 ACAD. POL. SCI. PROC.
489,490 (1968).

204.

For example, the total assessment for property in Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) in

1958 was $5.1 billion, but its fair market value was determined to be over $15 billion. S. SACKS.
supra note 55, at 227.
205. Macioce, Comments, 28 ACAD. POL. SCI. PROC. 537, 538 (1968).
206. Id.
207. S. SACKS. supra note 55, at 238.
208. In 1902, non-property sources contributed around $80 million or 11.4( of state and
local revenues. By 1961, revenues from non-property taxes had risen to $2.4 billion, but this
accounted for only 12.3% of the total state and local revenues. When only state revenues are
considered, non-property taxes contributed 97% of the total tax revenues in 1961. The cities have
remained dependent on the property tax. U.S. ADVISORY COMIISSION ON INTERGOVERNMIENTAL
RELATIONS. supra note 98, at 73-75.
209.

U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 2 (1968).

210.

Id.
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Despite this revenue, cities still remain much more dependent upon the
property tax which produced six and nine-tenths billion dollars for
local governments in 1966 as compared with one and eight-tenths
211
billion dollars from the sales and gross receipts taxes.
The sales tax can be imposed by several different methods, all of
which are in use by several cities. The method recommended by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations is the "piggy
back" sales tax.2 12 Under this system, the state administers and collects
the tax for the cities. Nine state legislatures have required that the state
impose the tax for the cities; state administration is optional in four
other states. 1 Where each local government applies its own sales tax,
whether administered locally or by the state, local businesses may be
hurt by shoppers and industries who purchase outside the taxing
district to avoid the sales tax.214 If the state automatically rebates part
of the sales tax to the community, the unfairness of the tax to
businesses is avoided by eliminating buyers' incentive to shop outside
the taxing district. ' ' The rates imposed by the cities vary from 0.5 to
21
3 percent, with most cities limiting the local tax to one percent.
In addition to penalizing businessmen in many areas where
shoppers tend to go out of the taxing jurisdiction, the sales tax requires
extensive bookkeeping. Where many items, such as food, drugs,2 17 and
sales to charitable organizations are exempt, problems of bookkeeping
are increased. Several states require retailers to maintain recordsconcerning the destination of goods and sales office operations, such
records being used to determine the amount of tax payable.218 In all
states, the sales tax is highly regressive. Regressiveness is moderated if
food for home consumption is exempted, since this item accounts for
21'
almost 30 percent of consumer expenditures for the average family.
Another non-property tax in wide use today is the gross receipts
tax. By applying a flat rate to gross receipts, the tax becomes a
turnover tax at each level of the exchange of consumer goods. Since it
211. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. No. 601, at 425
(89th ct. 1968).
212. U.S. ADVISORY COtMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNIENTAL RELATIONS 6 (1968).
213. Id.at 2.
214. S. SACKS. supra note 55, at 251.
215. Id.
216.

U.S.

ADVISORY COMMISSION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

2 (1968).

217. As of 1968, 14 states excluded food for home consumption and 22 states excluded
prescription medicine. Id.
218. Macioce,supra note 205, at 538-39.
219. S. SACKS, supra note 55, at 254.

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

1362

[VOL. 22

does not differentiate between businesses with high and low profit
margins, the tax is highly discriminatory towards those with low profit
margins. Also, the gross receipts tax gives great advantage to large

firms which distribute their own goods, thereby eliminating wholesalers
and jobbers who normally pass the tax to the consumers in the form
of higher prices.
C.

220

Advantages of the Municipal Income Tax

Many cities urgently need to reduce the burden of the property
tax. The income tax offers a means to relieve this burden 22 To produce

the same levels of revenue which could be received from a modest flat
rate income tax, sharp increases in the property tax rate would be

required.22 Although property taxes in cities with income taxes have
risen, the increase is substantially less than for cities of comparable size
without the income tax.2 3 As an illustration, from 1956-66 the property
tax in Philadelphia, which has an income tax, increased 52 per cent,
as compared with a 101 percent increase in Los Angeles, a non-income

tax city 2 4 A reasonable conclusion is that "the effect of any broadbased [municipal] income tax-pplicable to both business and

individuals alike-is to reduce the potential over-all municipal tax
225
payments by owners of property."
The income tax, like the general sales tax, but unlike the property

tax, produces an expanding yield during inflation. To keep pace with
rising service costs due to inflation, the property tax requires constant

property reassessment or rate increases. By taxing a certain percentage
220. Slater, Evaluation of Municipal Business Taxes, 28 ACAD. POL. SCI. PRoc. 527, 53233 (1968).
221. . In 1966, the municipal income tax accounted for the following percentages of total
tax collections: Philadelphia, 42% ($90 million); Detroit, 28% ($45 million); St. Louis, 34% ($27
million); Cincinnati, 39% (S17 million). Deran, An Overview of Municipal Income Tax, ACAD.
POL. SCI. PROC. 441,446 (1968).
222. Dayton, Ohio, collected $8.1 million from its income tax in 1963. It would have
required a property tax assessment of $10.57 per $1,000 assessed valuation to produce an
equivalent amount of revenue from the property tax. Similar 'figures in other cities are: $15.92 in
St. Louis; $8.72 in Toledo; $8.40 in Akron; and $8.30 in Youngstown. R. Sigafoos, The Stake
of Business in the Growing Municipal Income Tax Movement, in STATE AND LOCAL TAXES ON
BUSINESS --TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA 113, 123 (1965).
223. TAX FOUNDATION. INC., supra note 24, at 29.
224. Christian Science Monitor, April 13, 1968, at 3, col. 3 (midwest ed.).
225. Sigafoos, supra note 222, at 124. Another example is Detroit which obtained 98% of
its tax revenue from the property tax prior to instituting the income tax. In 1966, after four years
with the income tax, it obtained 69% of its tax revenue from the property tax. TAX FOUNDATION,
INC., supra note 24, at 29.
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of personal and corporate income, the municipal income tax
automatically accounts for fluctuations in the business cycle. Even
though the need for city service does not flucutate with the business
cycle, it is generally assumed that the tax burden should reflect the
ability to pay. Also, the municipal income tax provides a means for
the consolidation or elimination of many of the various local taxes. By
imposing the income tax at a sufficient rate to suppport a major
portion of the city budget, great administrative savings could be
achieved. Furthermore, residents and non-residents would be relieved of
many regressive and often hidden taxes. The U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has advised that:
Local jurisdictions should be discouraged from levying many kinds of taxes, none
of which produces enough to warrant reasonably good enforcement. Extensive tax
diversification is not practicable at the local level, especially in the smaller
jurisdictions.

Another major advantage of the income tax is the central city's
taxation of the earnings of non-residents. This allows the metropolitan
area to avoid the gaps caused by artificial political boundaries which
split the urban area into numerous taxing jurisdictions. Presumably,
daylight residents can justifiably be required to contribute to the tax
burden borne by residents of the core city. The yield from the tax on
commuters has been found to be roughly proportionate to that part of
the city's labor force residing outside the central city.
A common criticism of the city.income tax is that it encourages
local businesses and individuals to relocate elsewhere. Beside the loss
of employees who follow migrating industries, the chief concern of
many governmental officials seems to be the loss of capital and demand
in purchasing. The results of the studies on this point are inconclusive,
but no trend in migration was noticeable when Detroit enacted the tax
in 1962.27 Also, there has been no noticeable migration of either labor
or capital in'Ohio or Pennsylvania, where the local income tax is
commonly imposed. 21 8 Rather, it appears that the total effect of the
tax has been advantageous to the localeconomy, and has moderated
2 9
much of the unfairness of the present structure of municipal taxation

226.

U.S.

ADVISORY COMMISSION

ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS REPORT,

note 98, at 14.
227. White, Economic Evaluation of the Municipal Income Tax, 28

supra

ACAD. POL. SM.

PROC. 455, 457-58 (1968).

228.

Taylor, supra note 52, at 124.

229.

Buehler, Philadelphia'sExperience, 28 ACAD. POL. ScI. PROC. 449,451 (1968).
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ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF A

MUNICIPAL INCOME TAX

It is reasonable to assume that both the taxpayer and the tax
collector desire a system of income tax administration which is
characterized by fairness, simplicity, uniform compliance, and a
maximum tax yield at minimum costs. This desire is rarely fulfilled,
,however, where adjoining or substantially contiguous municipalities
each impose an income tax and administer it separately. Often the
taxpayer, if he is an individual, lives in one of these municipalities and
works in another. If the taxpayer is a corporation, it may do business
in several of the towns as well as employ persons from more than one
of these municipalities. In such instances, the individual taxpayer may
be required to file returns for his city of residence as well as his city
of employment. The corporate taxpayer may have the same
requirement plus the additional burden of determining how much tax
it should withhold from the wages of employees for each municipality
imposing an income tax. These difficulties make uniform compliance
difficult to achieve, and certainly do not promote the attainment of
either simplicity or fairness. From the standpoint of the tax collectors,
application of the current system results in neither maximum revenue
yields nor minimum administrative costs. Within a single metropolitan
area, where several municipalities levy and collect separate income
taxes, the duplication of effort involving the use of separate return
forms, payroll records, allocations, taxing offices, and tax
administrators has resulted in area-wide administration costs which
amount to nearly 50 cents of each dollar of tax revenue collected.,:",
To negate this absurd result, there appear to be two major
alternative plans of administration. First, an intergovernmental
coordination plan which would require the local income taxing
authority to coordinate its administrative efforts with the state income
taxing aut'hority and/or the Federal Internal Revenue Service.
Secondly, a metropolitan-wide administration plan, either in
connection with metropolitan government or through the use of a
cooperative central administrating agency, which would provide for
centralized collection at the metropolitan level. Both of these plans,
which will be discussed in detail, are commendable because they greatly
increase the simplicity of the tax system for the taxpayer while
simplifying the administration of the tax and reducing the costs of
collection.
230. Cook, EJftcts, Problems. and Soltions oJ Ceniral Uollection ol Munhipal Income
Taxes, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 900, 902 (1968).
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A.

Intergovernmental Coordination

For some time there has been interest in coordinating state and
federal income tax administration.P With the increasing popularity of
the municipal income tax it would seem appropriate to include local
income tax administration in an intergovernmental coordination
scheme. Coordination seems particularly logical since such problems as
computation of taxable income, deductions, exemptions, credits,
withholding, collection, and the entire process of checking income tax
returns are common with income taxes applied at any level of
government.
While coordination of local income tax administration with the
federal government appears to be an attractive plan, there is more
precedent to support state-local coordination efforts. The U.S.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations supports a plan
under which local and state governments would share information and
administrative facilities. The Commission's support for this plan grows
out of the position that it is incumbent upon the state to assist local
governments overcome administrative problems.2 32 State cooperation
could certainly help alleviate administrative burdens for the city.
Particularly where the state already imposes an income tax, state
collection of the municipal tax would result in great savings to the city
at little increased cost to the state. 3 As in New York, some states
would probably be unwilling to cooperate 34 In other states, which
already cooperate with local governments in the administration of
other types of non-property taxes, the addition of the income tax to the
coordinated program would seem to pose no great problem. For
example, in Mississippi, California, Illinois, and New Mexico, the state
collects non-property taxes for the cities and returns to each city its
appropriate share.25' Such an arrangement, called a tax supplement, is
231. See C. PENNIMAN & W. HELLER. STATE INCOME TAX ADMINISTRATION 213-48 (1959);
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Exchange of Information for Purposesof Federal,State and Local
Tax Administration, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 151 (1949).
232. See U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS REPORT. supra
note 98, at 12-15.
233. Mayor Lindsey has estimated that state collection of the New York City income tax
would result in an annual savings of up to eight million dollars to the city without substantial
increase in costs to to the state. Current city collection costs are over ten million dollars annually,
or about one dollar of cost for every S16 collected. See N.Y. Times, July 2, 1966, at 8, col. 4.
234. See N.Y. Times, July 2, 1966, at 8, col. 4.
235. 1. Labovitz & L. Ecker-Racz, PracticalSolutions to Financial Problems Created by
Multilevel Political Structures, PUBLIC FINANCES: NEEDS, SOURCES, AND UTILIZATION 149

(1961) (a Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research).
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recommended by the United States Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations,2 3 because it has resulted in less
duplication, superior enforcement, and general ease of administration.
Under this plan, the city would retain the power to alter or amend the
local tax, using the state administrative machinery for the purposes of
collection.
As mentioned above, the coordination of local income tax
administration with the federal income levy could potentially provide
the best answer to the problems of local administration of the tax.
Coordination plans are now in effect between several states and the
Internal Revenue Service, although local-federal coordination has not
yet been attempted. Such a plan would allow the taxpayer to compute
his taxable income for federal purposes and also use the same figure
for his local return. The use of identical tax rules would allow the tax
administrators to check on the taxpayer's veracity simply by
comparing the federal and municipal returns.2 37 One of the major
arguments against the federal-local plan is the possible loss of
municipal income due to the numerous deductions and exemptions
contained in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the federal
definition of taxable income. This argument looses its force, however,
upon a realization that coordination would make possible many
improvements in enforcement procedure1ls
There appears to be one major statutory obstacle to federal-local
coordination. Although section 6103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 indicates that federal returns are matters of public record,
section 6103(b) is susceptible to an interpretation that access to the
returns is limited to a request by the governor for an examination by
state officials for state tax purposes. It is unclear whether the meaning
of the word "state" is intended to exclude local officials even though
duly commissioned by the governor. Thus, until this statute is clarified,
236. "In -states where a particular tax, such as the sales or income tax, is in widespread
use by local governments and is simultaneously used also by the State, the most promising
coordinating device is the local tax supplement to the State tax." U.S. ADVISORY COMNIMISSION
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 98, at 14.
237. On the state level, greater compliance has been observed as to the federal rather than
the state income tax laws. C. PENNIMAN & W. HELLER, supra note 231, at 216. An official of the

California State Board of Equalization has observed: "For some unknown reason.

. .

individuals

apparently believe that it is a more serious matter to make false reports to the Federal
Government than to the state." Pierce, The Use by State Authorities of Federal Income Tax
Returns, 17 TAXES 637, 640 (1939).
238. See Miller, Proposal for a Federally-BasedNew York Personal Incone Tax, 13 TAX
L. REV. 183, 189 (1958).
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amended or repealed, the possibility for local-federal coordination
appears to be in doubt. Although it might be possible for local officials
to obtain the information indirectly through state officials, this practice
would present obvious coordination difficulties.
If the laws were liberalized, however, to allow local-federal
coordination, it might be possible to reach the ultimate level in ease of
administration and simplicity to the taxpayer. This, of course, would
be a situation in which the taxpayer could comply with local, state, and
federal filing requirements with a single tax return.2 39 Perhaps the
simplest manner to achieve this goal would be the utilization of the
1040 federal return to determine the net taxable income as a base
figure upon which local and state surcharges could be made in
appropriate percentages. The entire tax bill could then be paid by the
taxpayer in a single check, with the IRS then remitting to each state
and city their share of the revenue collected. Such a scheme would
obviously reduce administrative cost at the state and local level and
would not impose too great a burden on the IRS which is already in
possession of quite formidable machinery for the collection of income
taxes. Also, the compliance burden of the individual taxpayer, as well
as the withholding employer would be greatly reduced because only one
return and withholding operation under one set of tax laws and
regulations would be necessary.
It is readily apparent that the benefits of intergovernmental coordination can be attained only if federal-state-local tax administration
is characterized by close co-operation and a certain degree of
substantive and procedural continuity. Such close co-operation would
almost certainly necessitate the prospective incorporation of a. large
part of the Federal Internal Revenue Code as part of the state or local
income tax ordinance. Although there is no case law on the adoption
of federal income tax laws as part of local tax ordinances, there are
numerous cases dealing with incorporation of federal tax law as part
of a state's income tax laws. These cases present situations analogous
to those which would occur if local governments attempted similar
incorporation. Therefore, the legal validity of adding the local level to
a prospective intergovernmental co-ordination process can be
determined to some extent by examining the validity of attempted state
incorporation.
An analysis of cases in the area demonstrates that no
generalization can safely be made respecting the validity of prospective
239. See U.S.
note 98, at 142.

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REALTIONS REPORT, supra
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conformity provisions in state and local tax acts. The validity of such
provisions depends entirely upon the scope of the language of the
respective state or local statute and the extent to which it requires
conformity with the federal statute. Such provisions, where enacted,
have invariably been challenged on the ground that the incorporation
of federal tax law into the state taxing act is an unconstitutional
delegation of the states' legislative powers to the Federal Congress.
There are numerous cases to the effect that such prospective
conformity statutes, making state tax liability dependent on future as
well as present provisions of the federal tax code, are unconstitutional.
Cheney v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry.24 ° is a recent case which is
representative of this line of reasoning. A state income taxing statute
which provided for the determination of the taxable income of a
railway corporation on the basis of variable rate fixing standards set
by the Federal Interstate Commerce Commission was declared invalid.
The court reasoned that the state statute was an unconstitutional
delegation to a federal agency of power expressly reserved to the state
legislature by the state constitution. The court held that the state
statute provided a "fluid formula" since the standard for tax liability
could be varied with discretionary changes by the ICC in its rate fixing
standards. Subjecting the corporation to tax liability based on a
formula subject to such prospective federal legislation or administrative
rules was deemed to be an unconstitutional delegation of state
legislative power to the federal government because the state could
exercise no control over the future actions of the federal agency2 4'
On the other hand, several cases have adopted a more liberal
interpretation of attempts by the states to incorporate prospective
federal tax laws. The leading case is Alaska Steamship Co. v.
Mullaney.2 2 In this case, the court upheld a state income tax statute
which calculated state tax liability as a certain percentage of the
taxpayer's federal income tax liability. The state statute incorporated
present and prospective federal income tax law. In upholding the
statute against the contention that it was an unconstitutional attempt
to delegate state legislative functions to Congress, the court concluded
240. 239 Ark. 870, 394 S.W.2d 731 (1965). The same court disapproved a state statute
which provided that minimum wages to be paid must be predicated upon the minimum wages
determined by the Secretary of Labor of the United States. Crowly v. Thronborough, 226 Ark.
768, 294 S.W.2d 62 (1956).
241. See also Commonwealth v. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc., 345 Pa. 270, 27 A.2d 62
(1942).
242. 180 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1950).
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that the legislature's attempt to make local law conform to future
changes in federal law was not a mere labor-saving device for the
legislators, but was undertaken in order to obtain a degree of
uniformity. The court reasoned that:
The effort of the Alaska legislature to make its territorial income tax machinery
conform to the federal act, and to preserve and continue such conformity, makes
sense. It makes for convenience to the taxpayer and for simplicity of
administration . . . . A similar coordination has been recommended by students
of income tax problems for adoption by the states generally. Since the attainment
of this unijbrmity was in itselfa major objective of the Alaska legislature, in
enacting that the local law must conform, the Alaska legislature, which alone
its functions,
could mtake this decision, was itself acting, and it-as not abdicating
21 3
nor, in our opinion, making an invalid delegation to Congress.

The reasoning of Alaska Steamship was followed in the recent
Nebraska case of Anderson v. Tiemnann.24 Upholding a state income
tax statute based on present and future federal income tax laws, the
court concluded that the state legislature was acting within the
authorized powers granted it by the state constitution. The court
reasoned that the legislature could use all, part, or none of the laws of
the federal government. Although the present state tax was based on
federal law, the court noted that the state legislature was free to repeal
the present enactment and adopt a completely different method of
imposing its income tax. Therefore, the court concluded that the
adoption of a state income tax based upon present and future federal
income tax laws did not constitute a waiver of the sovereignty of the
state or a violation of the requirement of a representative form of
government.
Thus, it appears that the problem of legislative delegation of power
does not present an insurmountable constitutional -hurdle to the
incorporation of present and prospective federal tax law into a state (or
local) taxing statute. Indeed, the best reasoned cases allow
prospectivity. As long as the state retains the ultimate power to create
the sort of taxing scheme it desires, the legislature may exercise a
legitimate power to incorporate present and future tax law into the
state statute. Such incorporation does not appear to amount to an
243. Id. at 816-17 [emphasis added]. See also Hickel v. Stevenson, 416 P.2d 236 (Alaska
1966). This case, decided since Alaska became a state, gave approval to the same income tax act
which was the subject of the principal case. In upholding the tax, the court pointed to the fact
that the prime objective of the legislature in passing the conformity statute was to promote
convenience to the taxpayer and simplicity of administratiofd. Id. at 239.
244. 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967).
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unconstitutional delegation of ultimate legislative powers of taxation.24
Certainly, this liberal interpretation of the delegation of powers
problem is preferred to the more narrow approach illustrated by the
Cheney case. As long as the ultimate power of repeal and change
remains with the state legislature, then the state (and local) taxing
statute should be upheld against challenges of unconstitutional
delegation of powers. Such an approach would greatly facilitate
federal-state-local co-ordination in tax administration with a
consequent savings in administration at the state and local levels 2 '
B.

MetropolitanArea Administration

1. Administration Coincident With The Metropolitan Form of
Government.-With the growing popularity of the metropolitan form
of area-wide government which was pioneered in Nashville, Tennessee,
the importance of the municipal income tax as a feasible revenue source
increases. Indeed, such a tax appears to be particularly compatible with
the metropolitan form of government, although it has yet to be
implemented by such a system.247 Assuming that the power to levy an
income tax existed in a metropolitan government, the municipality
would enjoy a number of unique advantages in levying the tax.
First, because of the large land area within the jurisdiction of such
forms of government, there is a great likelihood that the tax would be
levied and collected within the same economic unit in which the
taxpayer lives, works, and shops. This would avoid the problems
245. See. e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Connelly, 142 Conn. 483, 115 A.2d 455
(1955). In Connelly, the court upheld a state statute adopting the federal definition of "gross
income" against a challenge that this was an unconstitutional delegation of state legislative power,
The court reasoned that only the federal definition was adopted and no legislative power over
taxation was relinquished because the state legislature retained ultimate power to define base and
rate, or to change the system. The court concluded that a state may adopt some of the standards
employed by the federal taxing statutes as a matter of taxpayer convenience and economy to the
state. Compare Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Barr, 194 So. 2d 890 (Miss. 1967), with City
Nat'l Bank v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 251 Iowa 603, 102 N.W.2d 381 (1960).
246. Cases have long allowed the adoption by the state of present federal income tax law
as part of the state tax itatute. As long as no attempt was made to include future federal
legislation or regulations within its operation, the statute was upheld. See, e.g., Opinion of the
Justices, 95 N.H. 540, 64 A.2d 322 (1949); Commonwealth v. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc., 345
Pa. 270, 27 A.2d 62 (1942); Pennsylvania v. Columbia Steel & Shafting Co., 62 Dauphin Co,
Rept. I (195 1). The Alaska Steamship and Tiemann cases represent a comparatively recent trend.
For further material on this problem, see note, Constitutionalityof North Dakota's Federalized
State Income Tax, 35 N.D.L. REV. 151 (1959).
247. State constitutional prohibitions against such a tax have prevented its implementation
in the states of Florida or Tennessee, where Metropolitan Miami, Metropolitan Jacksonville, and
Metropolitan Nashville are located.
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caused by artificial political boundaries. Such a plan would allow the
entire economic power of the area to be harnessed to the governmental
needs. It has long been recognized that metropolitan areas have
sufficient economic capacities to easily support the needs of local
government. The growing fiscal problems of cities can be attributed in
large part to the fragmentation of the metropolitan area, which is a
single economic unit, into many local political subdivisions.
Consequently, the area-wide capacity adequate to meet governmental
needs is distributed unevenly between different local jurisdictions and
different governmental functions. Also, politically fragmented
metropolitan areas have been marked by competition between the
various local units for the available revenues, with little or no sense of
area-wide responsiblity 4 8 This discouraging result could be effectively
changed by tax administration under a metropolitan form of
government.
The second advantage afforded by metropolitan governmental
administration of the municipal incbme tax is that the opportunity to
avoid the tax by migrating to a location beyond the reach of the
metropolitan taxing authority is lessened because of the broad
geographical area covered. The phenomenon of the "flight of wages"
from the city to the suburbs would become a minimal problem.
Presently, this "flight of wages" is a serious problem for cities whose
revenue needs are increasing sharply as operating costs spiral. For
example, a recent study of the New York City area reveals that in 1939
the city generated 69.8 percent of wage earnings for the entire 22
county metropolitan area, and that city residents accounted for 65.2
percent of the total earnings. By 1956, however, the city still generated
62 percent of the total wages for the area, but only 48.7 percent was
retained by city residents 49 Coupled with this were reports of a great
number of business firms migrating to the suburbs to escape city
taxes. 5 0 Simply because its jurisdiction encompasses the suburbs,
metropolitan government would be able to minimize these problems
and levy the income tax on previously untaxable incomes.
The third advantage to be found in metropolitan administration
of the income tax would result from the virtual elimination of the
problem of double taxation between the suburban taxing jurisdictions
ant the central city. Recalling the fate of the "unfortunate taxpayer '
248. See S. SACKS& W. HELLMUTH, Supra note 55, at 156.
249.

Knowles, City Tax on Incomes? Arguments Weighed, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1958, § 4,

at 7, col. I.
250.

N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1967, at 25, col. 1.
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in Thompson v. Cit' of Cincinnati,5' it would seem that the fairness of
the income tax would be enhanced by metropolitan administration.
There would be no possibility of double taxation under such an
administration because the suburban taxing authorities would have
disappeared.
The fourth advantage is the lessening of the withholding burden
on business within the area-wide jurisdiction of the taxing authority.
Businesses would no longer be faced with the frustrating problem2 '2 of
allocating withheld income between the various local taxing
jurisdictions, such as the employee's city of work and his city of
residence. Only one withholding operation would have to be made.
Finally, this type of system affords greatly reduced administrative
costs by reducing duplication of effort and enhancing enforcement.'
It is generally agreed that the income tax is more efficiently and
economically administered over a broad metropolitan area than it is in
a single municipality, particularly a small one. Because of large initial
costs, it is more expensive to establish and maintain the necessary
collection and administrative machinery for the purpose of collecting
a small number of returns than it would be for a large number. The
per return cost decreases as the number of returns processed
254
increases.
The foregoing discussion graphically demonstrates the advantages
of administering the municipal income tax coincident with a
metropolitan form of government. Areas evaluating the metropolitan
form of government should seriously consider the municipal income tax
as an additional revenue source.
2. Centralized Collection by Contract.-Forcities not operating
under the metropolitan form of government, an alternative plan offers
some of the advantages of metropolitan administration. Under this
plan, a central collection agency is created by agreement between the
central city and surrounding municipalities levying an income tax. This
agency administers the tax on a contract basis for all participating
municipalities and charges them a relatively nominal fee.
This type of plan is currently in operation in various Pennsylvania
jurisdictions and in the Cleveland, Ohio area. At present, 45 cities in
the Cleveland metropolitan area impose local income taxes. Of this
number, 34 have joined the City of Cleveland in a program of central
See text accompanying note 178 supra.
See R. SIGAFOOS. supra note 5, at 53-54.
See note 230 supra and accompanying text.
254. See S. SACKS & W. HELLMUTH. supra note 55, at 242.
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252.
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collection and administration. The Cleveland Central Collection
Agency operates under a contract which vests administrative authority
in the collection agency and provides for uniformity of ordinances and
regulations, responsibility of participants, audit, cost allocation,
distribution of revenue, cancellation, and exchange of information
between participating municipalities. Uniform return and witholding
25
forms are provided to taxpayers and employers. 1
Metropolitan government administration of an income tax has an
advantage over central collection in that after revenues are collected,
they can be channeled into projects of area-wide significance. Under the
central collection plan, revenue collected is divided and funnelled to
each participating municipality; therefore, political fragmentation
continues to endure. Despite this weakness, the central collection plan
is far superior to the present situation in most metropolitan areas
levying the municipal income tax. For example, the uniformity in
ordinances, regulations, and return and withholding procedures greatly
simplifies the compliance burden of the taxpayer and at the same time
contributes to ease of administration. Evasion is reduced as a result of
the centralized information file. Finally, administrative cost should be
greatly reduced over the entire metropolitan area since duplication in
administration of the tax is curtailed 5 Although administrative costs
may be reduced by central collection, problems of double taxation and
reciprocity between cities of residence and cities of employment still
remain. Likewise, the problems of the "flight of wages" and migration
to avoid the tax are not avoided.
In summary, a local income tax which is coincident to the
metropolitan form of government is preferable to the centralized
collection plan. Metropolitan government offers coordination in both
the collection and use of income tax revenue. On the other hand, the
central collection plan merely offers coordination in collection of
revenue with consequential savings in administrative costs. Either is
preferable to no plan at all, however, and both offer reasonable
alternatives to intergovernmental coordination.
VII.

THE POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF ENACTING

A MUNICIPAL

INCOME TAX

Suprisingly, there has been only minor local opposition to the levy
of a municipal income tax in many municipalities where the tax has
255. See Cook, supra note 230, at 903.
256. Id.at 910.

1374

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL, 22

been proposed. Usually the opposition diminished markedly after the
tax was enacted. In Ohio and Pennsylvania, the two states which have
had the most experience with the tax, the popularity of the city levy
on income has constantly increased 5 7 In other areas of the country,
however, the picture has been somewhat different. Voters in Duluth,
Minnesota, decisively rejected a local income tax proposal; in Los
Angeles, the city council dropped consideration of the tax because of
unfavorable public reaction. 5
Many people believe that enacting a municipal income tax would
prove difficult because any new tax would be more onerous to the
average voter than simply raising the rates on the existing taxes!" The
validity of this theory probably depends on the type of total tax burden
experienced in the community under consideration. 6 On the other
hand, a recent study of voter attitudes toward a state income tax levy
in Detroit, Michigan, reveals a different view. Respondents in a
random sample favored an income tax "based on ability to pay", a
phrase which implies a progressive rate structure, over -the traditional
sales and property taxes. This group considered the sales tax to be the
most ineqiitable of the three taxes and indicated that the income tax
was the fairest.2 6 1 Public acceptance of the municipal income tax
probably depends on whether the taxpayers of a community, as a
group, perceive a need for increased revenues to finance government
services and whether they recognize the necessity of tapping new
revenue sources 2 2 Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that such
a perceived need for new revenue must be so str'ong that it will
overcome the obvious reluctance of the public to incur the expense of
a new tax. The Detroit survey possibly supports this proposition since
the majority of respondents thought the income tax to be the "fairest"
257. It has been reported, however, that initial proposals of a municipal' income tax failed
to win approval by popular vote in several Ohio cities: Portsmouth, Lancaster, and Grandview
Heights. See R. SIGAFOOS, supra note 5, at 5.

258.

Id. at 6.

259.

See. e.g.. Knowles, The City Eyes a Tax on Income, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1965, § 4,

at 4.
260. Interview with C.W.Cook; Official, Tennessee Taxpayers Association, April 25, 1968,
and interview with Austin Adkinson and Herbert Bingham, Officials, Tennessee Municipal
League, April 25, 1968, All of the respondents in these interviews agreed that the public in general
would be very reluctant to see any new type of tax imposed.
261. David, Public Preference and State-Local Taxes, in ESSAYS IN STATE AND LOCAL
FINANCE 74-80 (H. Brazer ed. 1967). This study was made from 767 respondents in the Detroit

area in the spring of 1959 when Michigan was in the throes of a severe financial crisis.
262. The Detroit area study lends credence to this proposition. See id. at 75. See generally
Wessel, CincinnatiIncome Tax-An Enmergenci" FinancingDevice, 9 NAT'L TAX J. 84 (1956).
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tax, but favored a one percent increase in26 the
existing sales tax rather
3
than the implementation of the income tax.
In view of this discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that
implementation of a municipal income tax would probably prove
difficult in states where approval by a public referendum, requiring
direct expression of public attitudes toward the tax, is a prerequisite to
enactment. Enactment of a local levy, however, would also be difficult
in a state like New York, where only legislative approval is necessary
for implementation. Indeed, legislative approval may prove more
difficult than public approval because many legislators, who privately

agree with the need for a municipal income tax, might not wish to risk
the wrath of the electorate by attempting to initiate a new tax. 64 The

political difficulties in enacting the municipal income tax are manifold;
it is submitted, however, that the continually increasing need for new
revenue sources in cities26 5 and the exhaustion of old sources266 will
eventually create a more favorable public and legislative attitude

toward the tax.
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263. David, supra note 261, at 90-93.
264. Interview with Austin Adkinson and Herbert Bingham, Officials, Tennessee Municipal
League, April 25, 1968. The respondents in this interview indicated that many state and local
officials privately supported a local tax. However, it was considered that their overt support of
such a measure would jeopardize their positions with the public.
265. Id. The respondents reported that in Tennessee over the four year period from 196872 the projected revenue needs of cities exceeded the projected revenue collections from all sources
by over $200 million.
266. Interview with Austin Adkinson and Herbert Bingham, Officials, Tennessee Municipal
League, April 25, 1968, and interview with C.W. Cook, Official, Tennessee Taxpayers
Association, April 25, 1968. The respondents agreed that there was a limit above which the sales
tax rate could not be increased.. When this point was reached, the respondents indicated that
the legislature would be forced to amend the Tennessee constitution to allow municipalities to tax
incomes. None of the respondents believed that this would occur within the next ten years.

